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ABSTRACT 
Kiran Rose Auerbach; Partisan Accountability and the Perversion of Local Democracy: 
Evidence from Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(Under the direction of Graeme Robertson) 
How do politicians in emerging democracies undermine democratic performance despite 
adopting reforms that enhance responsiveness to citizens on paper? Looking at patron-client 
relations within political parties, this dissertation presents a mechanism, partisan accountability, 
by which resource-rich parties subvert accountability to citizens. Parties use organizational and 
electoral resources to build patronage networks in which resources are distributed to co-opt 
politicians into being accountable to central party elites rather than to constituents. Using original 
subnational data from Bosnia and Herzegovina that includes party organization, party finance, 
electoral representation, party discipline, and recalls initiated against mayors, I demonstrate how 
parties with extensive resources concentrate power by using patronage to undermine local 
democratic institutions.  
In emerging, unconsolidated democracies, parties are often weakly or non-programmatic, 
which incentivizes central party leaders to maximize their control over political and economic 
resources and to provide minimum benefits to citizens. As a result, variations in government 
performance may reflect political favors or retribution that are consequences of intra-party 
patronage rather than policy effort. Unpacking how the resources of political parties affect elite 
strategies to concentrate power over subnational units therefore contributes to our understanding 
of why many young democracies display uneven and substandard performance within their 
territories, lagging far behind their institutional reforms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Laktaši, Republika Srpska  
Milovan Topolović, a popular mayor from a booming agricultural town close to the 
Croatian border, was elected to a third term in 2012. He won by a margin of 31 percentage 
points, amounting to a greater vote share than his party’s list of municipal counselors. The mayor 
was widely known for his progressive public policies by the community and international 
donors, who had co-financed several large municipal projects.1 Yet pressure was mounting on 
him from his party’s president, Milorad Dodik, and a local tycoon who was godfather to Dodik’s 
children. The mayor’s refusal to spend money from the municipality’s budget on the tycoon’s 
local soccer club was causing a major rift between the mayor and his party’s president. The 
mayor was a longtime friend of Dodik and had assisted him back in 1996 in founding the 
Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), at the time a pro-democratic opposition 
party to the nationalistic Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) which had been founded by convicted 
war criminal Radovan Karadzić. In September 2014, two months after the mayor was recognized 
by a pan-European NGO as the best mayor of the decade in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and 
the 2014 best mayor-manager in his regional entity, the Republika Srpska (RS), he was forced to 
submit his resignation and was removed from SNSD. His political career had just abruptly 
ended. Why would SNSD, by now the most powerful political party in the RS, intimidate a 
                                                 
1References for the two cases presented in the introduction are listed in Appendix 2. They include interviews with 
the mayors and other political stakeholders, media and NGO reports, and official government statistics. Each claim 
is corroborated by at least two different sources and no sources contradict any claim. 
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popular, high-performing mayor who brought in more votes than any other candidate in the 
SNSD party president’s hometown?  
What happened to this mayor was not an isolated incident. Two years later in the run-up 
to the 2016 local elections, SNSD’s municipal board voted to nominate the SNSD mayor who 
had replaced the former mayor in 2014 by a vote of 47 to 42. But Dodik had warned board 
members to nominate a different candidate because like the former mayor, the current mayor 
refused to comply with the tycoon’s demands. Livid that the board members disobeyed his 
orders, Dodik annulled their decision and dissolved the entire board. A new board was 
established and nominated an entirely different candidate, who went on to win the mayorship.  
Goražde, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Muhamed Ramović, known by his nickname “Rambo,” is another popular mayor from 
the eastern corner of Bosnia’s Muslim-Croat Federation. He was removed from his party, SBB, 
in 2014 for proposing to form a coalition at the cantonal level with the governing party, the Party 
for Democratic Action (SDA). Although the mayor’s intention was to ingratiate himself to 
cantonal actors who held the purse-strings for his municipality, his party president punished him 
for overstepping his authority. The punishment, however, only bolstered the mayor’s reputation. 
He finished out his second term and ran as an independent candidate in 2016, winning by 31 
percentage points over the second place candidate. The runner-up was an inexperienced 25-year-
old who had been fielded jointly by SBB and SDA. This was his largest margin of victory yet.  
Rambo’s victory, however, came as no surprise to anyone. The mayor’s popularity was 
based on a solid foundation of good governance. During his two terms, the municipality’s 
unemployment rate fell by more than 10 percentage points, business start-ups were flourishing, 
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and people from neighboring towns were commuting to Goražde to work in its thriving factories. 
How had the mayor accomplished this feat despite being a member of three different political 
parties in fifteen years? Back in 2000, the local SDA establishment had fired him from his 
position as high school principal for trying to modernize Goražde’s local high school. He had 
been told to do an average job and not try to stand out. This punishment made the mayor aware 
that his style of governance was fundamentally incompatible with party politics in BiH.  
As mayor, his strategy became more pragmatic: First, to gain the community’s trust, he 
established public channels of communication with his constituents in which they could voice 
their concerns to him directly, and he worked closely with Goražde’s municipal counselors and 
selected a team of young, educated advisors to help him push out numerous pro-development 
policies. Second, seeing that financial contributions from higher levels of government were 
inadequate and irregular, he funded most of Goražde’s public projects through international 
grants, effectively bypassing Bosnia’s labyrinth of public institutions staffed by civil servants 
and politicians who owe their jobs to the political parties currently in government. When the 
mayor finally transgressed his position within the party, he was punished by SBB but his 
political career did not suffer.  
Why do political parties in emerging democracies punish high-performing mayors with 
impressive policy records who are well-liked by their constituents? Why are some parties more 
effective in disciplining mayors than others? And what effects do these punishments have on 
local democracy? Democratic theory would expect parties to respect, even reward, popular and 
responsive mayors who improve the public image of the party and increase the party’s vote 
share. Furthermore, retaining popular mayors would seem to be critical for the survival of parties 
that have few elected politicians and do not have extensive organizational infrastructure. Yet 
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these punishments against two high-performing mayors from different parties in distant towns 
and in different ethno-federal regions say otherwise.  
Current answers 
Conventional wisdom holds that vibrant political party competition, specifically the 
threat of losing elections, disciplines parties to respond to citizens interests (Geddes 1994, 
Grzymala-Busse 2007, Vachudova 2005, Berliner and Erlich 2015). In addition, scholars have 
linked the stability of a country’s party system to greater democratic quality (Mainwaring 1999, 
Mainwaring and Torcal 2006, Mainwaring and Zoco 2007, Schleiter and Voznaya 2016). 
According to these perspectives, strong parties are vital for democracy because they contribute to 
the stability of electoral competition, the predictability of governing coalitions, and the 
credibility of the opposition, and they foster programmatic linkage with voters. These views 
build on Schumpeter’s (1942) classic definition of democracy as a procedure of regularized 
elections enabling citizens to choose their leaders and evict them. While a voluminous literature 
has expanded on the substantive conditions that enable elections to be free and fair, democracy’s 
defining attribute centers on competitive elections as the mechanism by which citizens hold 
politicians accountable for governance.  
However the party competition literature has been criticized for overlooking the 
possibility that strong party organizations also have capacities to subvert democratic mechanisms 
of accountability, even when elections are competitive. These criticisms tend to come from 
literature that has explored non-programmatic modes of linkage between politicians and citizens, 
such as clientelism, in which parties target private goods to voters in exchange for political 
support rather than committing to broad socio-economic platforms that benefit most citizens. 
This group of scholars find that clientelism, a political strategy that is pervasive in most young, 
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third-wave democracies, may not only coexist with vibrant party competition and electoral 
stability (Keefer and Vlaicu 2008, Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, Luna and Altman 2011, 
Remmer 2007), but that competition may also fuel it. (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, Sanadanan 
2012). Others point out that strong party organizations are imperative for clientelistic networks to 
function effectively (Kitschelt and Kselman 2012, Stokes 2005). Furthermore, Randall and 
Svasand (2002) warn that large variations in the institutionalization and organizational 
development of individual parties may hinder the competitiveness of the political system and 
limit the representation of certain group interests. However, most scholarship takes national party 
systems as the units of analysis rather than scaling down to look at variations in the 
organizational strength of individual parties. Even fewer works analyze the influence of intra-
party politics on electoral competition and democracy more broadly, but they do not look 
directly at democratic performance (i.e. Bohlken 2016, Kemahlioglu 2012, Tavits 2013). 
Main Argument 
My work challenges conventional assumptions that competitive elections and the 
existence of democratic institutions are indicative of well-performing democracies. I show that 
the mechanisms on which such arguments rely may be subverted in practice by strong political 
parties. My approach differs from previous work in two main respects. First, whereas most 
works treat parties as unitary actors, I consider their internal relations and view parties as 
networks of actors who have diverse interests and interact at multiple levels of governance. 
Second, my work directly assesses the effectiveness of democratic institutions by their de facto 
performance, rather than by their de jure formal rules which politicians often subvert in practice. 
How do the internal dynamics of political parties affect the performance of subnational 
democratic institutions? 
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I analyze how party organizational and electoral resources structure patron-client politics 
inside parties to identify an alternative mechanism that leads subnational democratic institutions 
to function poorly. I argue that parties with strong organizations and electoral representation at 
the national level may undermine the performance of local democratic institutions. These parties 
build elaborate patronage networks in which resources are distributed as a means to co-opt 
politicians into being accountable to party leaders rather than to their constituents, a phenomenon 
I refer to as partisan accountability. On the other hand, parties that are organizationally 
undeveloped and lack national representation may foster greater accountability to citizens at 
subnational levels. Since weak parties lack patronage resources to co-opt party members or 
funnel them to voters, local politicians from these parties must build their reputations by being 
responsive to the interests of ordinary citizens. In other words, the scarcity of patronage 
resources makes responsiveness to citizens instrumental for the re-election chances of politicians 
from weak parties. 
To connect partisan accountability back to the puzzle from the first section, let us 
consider the political environment in many emerging democracies in which electoral competition 
is volatile, and it is costly for parties to credibly commit to electoral promises (Keefer 2007). 
Instead, parties often adopt non-programmatic linkages with voters, such as ethnic appeals and 
clientelistic benefits. This makes leaders of resource-rich parties more preoccupied with 
maintaining control over the party’s patronage network than providing public goods and 
improving socio-economic development. Since these party leaders see patronage as the primary 
vehicle to increase the party’s political and economic power, they care about maintaining a loyal 
cadre of members and party affiliates. Their power is therefore threatened by independent–
minded politicians who build their reputations by promoting programmatic policies. This leads 
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strong parties to entrench their political power over subnational units by punishing high-
performing mayors and replacing them with party loyalists, rather by promoting governance that 
is responsive to citizen interests. 
Overview of Dissertation 
The specific context that I investigate is Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), a country rarely 
included in the comparative democratization literature due to the complexity of its political 
institutions, which relate to its consociational, power-sharing arrangements. BiH however meets 
the scope conditions of my argument, and its political institutions offer a unique research design 
in which to test my theory. First and foremost, BiH is a competitive electoral democracy in 
which corruption is widespread and parties are weakly or non-programmatic. Furthermore, 
Bosnia’s central state has few administrative competencies that mainly relate to foreign policy, 
monetary policy, and border control (DPA 1995). The main arena of party competition and 
political conflict instead occurs in Bosnia’s two highly autonomous, ethno-federal regions, 
formally referred to as entities.  
I test my theory separately in each entity. This design has the advantage of automatically 
controlling for common cultural and contextual factors, while accounting for alternative 
explanations based on political competition, ethnic diversity, and decentralization, which are the 
areas in which the two entities differ.  In particular, the Republika Srpska (RS) is ethnically 
homogenous and mainly populated by Serbs, while the Federation of BiH is multi-ethnic and 
home to most of Bosnia’s Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) and Croats. In Chapter 1, I show how 
differences in ethnic composition lead the RS and FBiH to have distinct party subsystems. In 
addition, the RS has a similar, but more centralized administrative structure than the FBiH, 
which contains cantons between entity and municipal governments.  
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Moving back to the puzzle that motivates my research, Tables 1 and 2 identify mayors 
who were punished by their parties over four election cycles. I define a punishment as a 
deliberate action taken by a political party to hurt a mayor’s political career. Tables 1 and 2 
identify fifteen mayors who received punishments, the strength of the party, the type of 
punishment, and whether the mayor stayed active in politics afterwards. Looking at the varieties 
of punishments, recalls stand out as particularly anomalous. Recalls are an institution of local 
direct democracy which were intended to make mayors more accountable to their constituents. 
Adopted simultaneously by both entities as part of a new electoral law, recalls consist of three 
stages, each of which were meant to enable citizens to directly sanction mayors for poor 
performance. Yet the table shows that four out of fifteen intra-party punishments also took the 
form of recalls, running contrary to the formal purpose of this democratic institution. 
Table 1: Mayors Punished by their Parties (RS) 2004-2016 
Party Punishment Municpality Year Political Career 
SNSD criminal indictment Brod 2012 No 
SNSD criminal indictment I. Drvar 2015 No 
SNSD recall Kneževo 2007 Yes 
SNSD forced resignation Laktaši 2014 No 
SNSD demotion within party  Laktaši 2016 Yes 
SNSD recall Milići 2015 No 
SNSD recall Vlasenica 2007 No 
SP removal from party Foča 2010 Yes 
 
Table 2: Mayors Punished by their Parties (FBiH) 2004-2016 
Party Punishment Municpality Year Political Career 
SBB removal from party Goražde 2014 Yes 
SDA recall Banovići 2014 No 
SDA suspended from party  Bihać 2016 Yes 
SDA removal from party Visoko 2011 Yes 
SDA removal from party Visoko 2016 Yes 
SNSD removal from party B. Petrovac 2008 Yes 
SNSD demotion within party Drvar 2016 No 
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 I use data from all recalls initiated during this period to test my theory of partisan 
accountability. Chapter 1 presents the core theoretical framework connecting the strength of 
party resources to the subversion of local democratic performance. I provide quantitative and 
qualitative evidence to show that recalls are rarely initiated because of substandard governance. 
Instead, strong parties initiate recalls to extend control over subnational units. These parties 
attempt to remove disloyal mayors from their own ranks or vulnerable mayors from opposing 
parties so they can replace incumbent mayors with docile partisans who are accountable to 
central party officials rather than to constituents. In initiating recalls for political advantage, 
strong parties break programmatic linkages between mayors and their local communities. 
 Chapter 2 extends the analysis by investigating the political factors that determine the 
conditions under which mayors are successfully removed in recall referenda. I show that party 
resources provide pernicious capacities to undermine recall referenda while permissive 
institutional rules provide them with incentives to frequently initiate recalls. Furthermore, I find 
that low voter turnout is the biggest predictor of referendum success, suggesting that the 
competitive strategies of strong parties directly and indirectly reduce political participation.  
 Chapter 3 brings the discussion back to intra-party punishments more broadly. I present 
four case studies in a controlled, comparative design in which I pair cases from the same entities 
that vary on the treatment (strength of mayor’s party). Within-case information traces different 
parts of the causal mechanism, such as the source of the conflict and the punishment strategy, 
illustrating how partisan accountability functions in practice. Cross-case comparisons show that 
the severity of punishments and the success in removing mayors differ for strong and weak 
parties. Furthermore, I show that intra-party punishments are targeted against high-performing 
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mayors who are more accountable to their constituents than their parties, which has negative 
implications for local self-governance and democracy. 
Broader Implications 
By considering patronage practices inside of political parties, my research presents an 
alternative mechanism that challenges the conventional notion that sustained political 
competition between strong and stable party organizations improves democracy. In emerging, 
unconsolidated democracies—which are often characterized by weakly or non-programmatic 
political parties—electoral competition may encourage politicians to be accountable to their 
parties rather than to their constituents who voted them in office. As a result, variations in 
government performance may reflect partisan conflicts that are consequences of collusion and 
intra-party competition rather than government responsiveness to citizens. Unpacking how the 
resources of political parties affect local democratic performance therefore contributes to our 
understanding of why many young democracies display uneven and substandard governance and 
socio-economic development within their territories, lagging far behind their extensive 
institutional reforms. 
In the future, it would be informative to look at how party strength affects local 
democracy in different party systems with varying degrees of democratic consolidation. For 
example, by extending the analysis to other countries in the Western Balkans, other developing 
democracies, and then comparing these findings to the dynamics in established democracies, we 
would be better able to establish the boundaries of the scope conditions for partisan 
accountability. This would enable us to better understand in which types of party systems are 
strong parties a virtue, supporting institutions and public policies that entrench the quality of 
democratic governance and citizen representation. Furthermore, comparing how party strength, 
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electoral competition, and partisan accountability function in different systems may help us to 
understand which aspects of competition lead parties to establish programmatic over non-
programmatic linkages with citizens. 
From a policy perspective, the dynamics in BiH are readily generalizable to other 
democracies that receive international aid for democracy promotion in the area of elections and 
political parties. The strategy of Western donors has thus far been to identify strong individuals 
from the opposition and then support them financially, as a means to foster electoral competition 
and encourage citizens to replace corrupt incumbents with pro-democratic opposition parties. 
However, from Saakashvili in Georgia to Orban in Hungary to Dodik in the Republika Srpska, 
my research shows that there is a danger of funneling resources into parties and over-building 
their capacities. My theory of partisan accountability explains why international aid spent in this 
way is likely to have negative consequences: Once the opposition takes over, they often use party 
resources to consolidate political and economic control through patronage instead of responding 
to the interests of ordinary citizens. The next chapter lays out my theoretical framework 
connecting the strength of party resources to the subversion of local democratic performance, 
and I illustrate the phenomenon empirically by analyzing the political factors that motivate 
politicians to initiate recalls against mayors. 
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1. ACCOUNTABLE TO WHOM? HOW STRONG PARTIES UNDERMINE LOCAL 
DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE 
 
 
Abstract 
 
How do politicians in young democracies undermine democratic performance despite adopting 
reforms that enhance responsiveness to citizens on paper? Looking at patron-client relations within 
political parties, this chapter presents a mechanism, partisan accountability, by which strong 
parties subvert accountability to citizens. Strong parties use their organizational and electoral 
resources to build patronage networks in which resources are distributed to co-opt politicians into 
being accountable to central party elites rather than to constituents. Using original subnational data 
from Bosnia and Herzegovina which include party resources and recalls initiated against mayors, 
I demonstrate that recalls are rarely linked to the quality of local governance. Instead, strong parties 
subvert this institution of local direct democracy as a means to extend partisan control over 
subnational units. By measuring de facto institutional performance, my research demonstrates an 
alternative path by which parties in developing democracies consolidate power to the detriment of 
ordinary citizens.  
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1.1. Introduction  
The international community and scholars of comparative democratization alike celebrate 
when governments adopt political reforms that espouse liberal democratic values. For third-wave 
countries, such reforms are seen as incremental progress that augurs well for the transition to 
democracy. However, the implementation of these reforms often fail to meet expectations, even 
in contexts where governments have crafted them to strengthen democratic accountability. How 
do politicians in young, electoral democracies subvert institutional reforms that are designed to 
improve accountability to citizens? In analyzing this question, scholars have looked at the 
features of parties and party systems, and a burgeoning literature investigates these dynamics at 
subnational levels. Yet there are two major shortcomings. First, most works treat parties as 
unitary actors, which obscures intra-party dynamics amongst networks of actors who have 
divergent interests and operate at multiple levels of government. Second, scholarship tends to 
measure institutional reforms de jure instead of de facto, which paints a misleading picture of 
institutional effectiveness. As a result, we know little about how intra-party politics affect the 
performance of subnational democratic institutions. 
Conventional wisdom holds that the threat of losing elections acts as an insurance 
mechanism, encouraging ruling parties to initiate democracy-enhancing reforms that constrain 
rent-seeking and patronage (Geddes 1994, Grzymala-Busse 2007, Vachudova 2005, Berliner and 
Erlich 2015). By tying their hands in the present, ruling parties prevent their competitors from 
usurping government spoils in the future. Furthermore, the degree of party system 
institutionalization (PSI)—consisting of electoral stability, party roots in society, popular 
legitimacy of parties, and party organizational strength—has been linked to greater democratic 
quality (Mainwaring and Scully 1995, Mainwaring 1999, Schleiter and Voznaya 2016). Other 
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literature calls these claims into question by demonstrating that non-programmatic linkages 
between parties and citizens, such as clientelism, may coexist with vibrant party competition and 
electoral stability to undermine the quality of democracy in the long run (Keefer and Vlaicu 
2008, Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, Luna and Altman 2011). Yet these works largely view 
clientelism as an electoral strategy in which parties target private goods to citizens in exchange 
for political support. They do not explore the nature of patron-client relations inside of parties or 
their effects on democratic governance. In addition, the relationship between party organizational 
strength and the other dimensions of PSI has been understudied. 
My work challenges conventional assumptions that competitive, stable party systems and 
the adoption of democratic reforms improve democratic performance. I show that the 
mechanisms underpinning such arguments may be subverted by strong, resource-rich political 
parties. Furthermore, I analyze how organizational and electoral resources structure patron-client 
politics within parties to identify an alternative mechanism that leads subnational democratic 
institutions to function poorly. I argue that parties with extensive organizations and electoral 
representation at the national level are more likely to undermine the performance of local 
democratic institutions. These parties build elaborate patronage networks in which resources are 
distributed as a means to co-opt politicians into being accountable to central party leaders rather 
than to their constituents, a phenomenon I refer to as partisan accountability. This leads strong 
parties to subvert citizen interests to entrench their political power over subnational units.  
My theory applies to competitive electoral democracies, which are characterized as 
having a relatively level playing field between incumbent and opposition parties (Levitsky and 
Way 2010). The specific context I investigate is Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose subnational 
reforms and political institutions present a unique research design in which to test my theory. In 
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2004, Bosnia’s two highly autonomous federal regions adopted local electoral reforms, which 
included a recall procedure for citizens to sanction poor-performing mayors. Although hailed by 
the international community as an institution of direct democracy for citizens to hold mayors 
accountable, in practice recalls are rarely linked to the quality of local governance. Instead the 
evidence demonstrates that central party officials from electorally and organizationally strong 
parties subvert recalls into an informal means to extend their political and economic control over 
sub-national units. These party elites co-opt municipal counselors into sanctioning mayors from 
opposing parties whom they deem politically vulnerable, or they use recalls as a means to punish 
disloyal mayors from their own parties. My work leverages variations in the resource 
endowments of political parties and directly measures the effectiveness of recalls in supporting 
local democracy. In addition, I account for alternative explanations based on the nature of 
political competition and ethnicity by treating Bosnia’s regional entities, which differ on these 
variables, separately.  
By uncovering patronage practices within political parties, this chapter presents an 
alternative, top-down mechanism by which strong party organizations may stifle subnational 
democratization. In emerging democracies, parties are often weakly or non-programmatic, which 
incentivizes central party leaders to maximize their control over political and economic resources 
and to provide minimum benefits to citizens. In such contexts, political competition may 
encourage politicians to be accountable to their party leaders rather than to their constituents. As 
a result, variations in government performance may reflect political favors, retribution, and 
conflict that are consequences of intra-party patronage and strategies of competition. Patterns of 
rewards and sanctioning of local politicians may therefore be more reflective of political interests 
rather than policy outputs. Unpacking how the resources of political parties affect elite strategies 
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to concentrate political power over subnational units contributes to our understanding of why 
many young democracies display uneven and substandard performance, lagging far behind their 
extensive institutional reforms. 
 
1.2. Political Parties in Developing Democracies 
Influential scholarship has linked the quality of governance and the adoption of 
democratic reforms to inter-party competition (Berliner and Erlich 2015, Geddes 1994, 
Grzymala-Busse 2007, O’Dwyer 2006, Vachudova 2005) and the institutionalization of party 
systems (Mainwaring 1999, Mainwaring and Torcal 2006, Mainwaring and Zoco 2007, Schleiter 
and Voznaya 2016). These bodies of literature argue that strong governing and opposition parties 
are vital for democracy because they contribute to the stability of electoral competition, the 
predictability of governing coalitions, the credibility of the opposition, and programmatic linkage 
with voters. However, this scholarship overlooks that strong party organizations also have 
capacities to subvert these mechanisms, even in competitive systems. 
Indeed, other scholarship has questioned some of the assumptions of this literature. One 
group has questioned the construct validity of party system institutionalization (PSI), spanning 
multiple iterations of the concept. In 1998, Levitsky pointed out that two dimensions of Samuel 
Huntington’s original conceptualization did not move in the same direction within a single party. 
Meanwhile, Mainwaring and Scully (1995) and Mainwaring (1999) adapted the concept to 
developing democracies and it quickly became the gold standard. Their conceptualization lumps 
together four dimensions of party systems: electoral stability, rootedness in society, popular 
legitimacy of parties, and organizational strength. Yet more than a decade later, Luna and 
Altman (2011) and Luna (2014) show that electoral stability and programmatic roots do not 
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necessarily move in the same direction. Furthermore, Randall and Svasand (2002) warn that the 
institutionalization of individual parties does not automatically lead to the institutionalization of 
the party system, and that large variations in the level of institutionalization and organizational 
development of parties may hinder the overall competitiveness of the political system and limit 
the representation of certain group interests. However, most scholarship has overlooked how 
variations in the organizational strength of individual parties affect party system 
institutionalization and democratic representation.2  
Research on the micro-foundations of clientelism—including the causes, mechanisms, 
and consequences—has also debunked some of the claims of the political competition and PSI 
literature. Consensus exists that a major impediment to democratic representation and socio-
economic development is that parties in young democracies often invest in clientelistic party 
machines as an electoral strategy. Rather than making broad programmatic appeals to voters, 
clientelistic parties target private goods to voters in exchange for political support.  Several 
scholars have not only found that clientelism and patronage may coexist with competition 
(Kopecky 2011, Remmer 2007, Weitz-Shapiro 2012), but also that competition may fuel it in 
high-poverty contexts (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, Sanadanan 2012). Others point out that 
strong party organizations—the fourth dimension of Mainwaring and Scully’s (1995) PSI 
concept—are imperative for clientelistic networks to function effectively (Kitschelt and Kselman 
2012, Stokes 2005).  
I build on this literature by considering patron-client relations inside political parties. 
Indeed, classical party theories warned long ago that the evolution of individual party 
                                                 
2For a comprehensive review of the PSI literature, see Casal-Bertoa (2016). 
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organizations inevitably leads to the concentration of power into the hands of elites and 
bureaucratic interests (Weber 1978, Michels 1915). Panebianco’s (1988) party life-cycle 
approach similarly expects hierarchical power relations between the party’s central leadership 
and its activist base (the former prioritizing office-seeking goals while the latter prioritizes 
ideology) to have profound implications for party-building strategies and linkage with the 
electorate. Among the sparse empirical literature looking at power constellations within parties 
in developing democracies, three major works investigate disparate features of party organization 
and subnational politics. Building on the party institutionalization literature, Tavits (2013) finds 
that stronger organizational resources enhance a party’s electoral success in post-communist 
countries, but her work does not explicitly look at the implications for governance or democracy. 
Building on the clientelism literature, Kemahlioglu (2012) finds that the dependence of 
politicians on party support and open competition for party leadership reduces subnational 
patronage in Argentina and Turkey. Since her outcome of interest is patronage jobs provided by 
politicians to citizens in exchange for political support, her findings do not focus on how 
patronage affects institutional performance. Bohlken (2016) finds that intra-party competition 
and lack of elite control over a party’s organizational network leads to the adoption of 
institutional reforms that enhance local democracy in India. However, she does not consider the 
effectiveness of these institutions on the ground, so her work does not consider alternative paths 
by which politicians may subvert these reforms in practice. 
My work adds to this debate by investigating how variations in the organizational and 
electoral resources of parties within a system affect patterns of intra-party patronage and local 
democratic performance. Specifically, I present a mechanism that links greater party resource 
endowments to greater central leadership control and the cooptation of local level politicians. 
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This leads strong, centralized parties to undermine formal mechanisms of local democratic 
accountability. As such, my approach is in line with Kopecky, Mair and Spirova (2011), who 
view patronage as an organizational resource that parties use to control state institutions, rather 
than as a means of garnering mass electoral support from voters. More broadly, my research 
provides insights into the emerging literature on the sources of institutional weakness and the 
proliferation of informal rules in emerging democracies (Grzymala-Busse 2010, Holland 2016, 
Levitsky and Murillo 2009, Lupu and Riedl 2012). Furthermore, it speaks to literature on 
subnational authoritarianism (Gibson 2005, Gervasoni 2010) by showing how party-building 
strategies and intra-party relationships between the center and periphery undermine local 
democratization. 
1.3. Partisan Accountability: Theoretical Framework 
My theory applies to competitive electoral democracies with weakly or non-
programmatic parties. These types of democracies fall short of liberal democratic standards and 
generally exhibit high degrees of corruption. However, electoral democracies can be 
distinguished from competitive-authoritarian regimes by the existence of a relatively level 
playing field between incumbent and opposition parties, so that opposition parties can 
meaningfully compete and organize between elections (Levitsky and Way 2010). Patronage is a 
form of political corruption common in electoral democracies that affects the quality of 
democracy. By standard definitions, patronage involves the exchange of jobs, favors, and other 
financial incentives as rewards for political support. For my study, I am interested in intra-party 
patronage, which refers to patron-client relations between central party officials (patrons) and 
party members, supporters, or economic or political affiliates not formally within the party 
structure (clients). Thus my theory of partisan accountability does not directly examine 
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patronage relations between politicians and citizens. Instead it links intra-party patronage to the 
capacity of strong parties to subvert the effectiveness of local democratic institutions.  
The main assumption is that political parties seek to maximize political and economic 
power. In the context of subnational politics, this means controlling local and regional 
governments and profiting from their resources (Gibson 2005). This goal is at odds with the 
interests of ordinary citizens, who desire greater investments in public goods and the adoption of 
policies that enhance socio-economic welfare in their communities. This premise is consistent 
with Keefer (2007) and Keefer and Vlaicu (2008), who argue that it is more costly for politicians 
in young democracies to credibly commit to policies that serve the broad public interest than to 
establish credibility by targeting goods to narrow groups of voters. These authors find that young 
democracies also tend to perform worse than older ones: they provide fewer public goods, more 
targeted spending, and engage in greater rent-seeking. Therefore, because parties in young 
democracies cannot credibly commit to broad programmatic policies, they prefer to provide the 
minimum benefits to citizens that will get them elected. 
Next, abundant resources enable parties to build intra-party patronage networks that 
induce the loyalty of members to the interests of central party elites. Recent scholarship has 
stressed that a dense network of local branches attracts supporters and helps parties to win 
elections (Tavits 2013, Samuels and Zoco 2014, Van Dyck 2014). Other scholars note that in 
clientelistic systems, strong party organizations are necessary to effectively target private goods 
to citizens and to monitor their political support, for example through local intermediaries such 
as brokers (Stokes 2005, Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, Kitschelt and Kselman 2012). For 
similar reasons, I hold that party finance and grassroots infrastructure may fuel intra-party 
patronage, enabling central party officials to selectively reward, punish, and monitor the 
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compliance of local party stakeholders. In this way, strong organizational resources enable 
central party elites to influence politics in diverse local environments. Party resources also raise 
entry and exit costs for members: moving up the ranks in parties with dense membership takes 
more time than in organizationally undeveloped parties (Chhiber, Jensensius, and Suryanarayan 
2014 make a similar point), while exiting incurs reputational costs and loss of patronage rewards. 
This vulnerability induces greater party discipline, making voice and exit difficult (see 
Hirschmann 1970).  
The lack of intra-party democracy—or the ability of party members to hold leaders 
accountable—affects the relationship between local politicians and their constituents: If 
politicians do not act independently of party leaders, then they are de facto less responsive to 
their constituents who voted them in office. I refer to this phenomenon as partisan 
accountability. Placing this concept in a principal-agent framework, partisan accountability 
means that principals are central party officials (rather than citizens) with lower-level co-
partisans acting as central party agents. Furthermore, strong parties may shirk responsiveness to 
citizens because their accumulated stocks of resources help them to win elections. This explains 
why mayors and municipal counselors from strong parties can afford to target benefits to key 
party supporters rather than investing in local public goods and services. By contrast, weak 
parties—those that are organizationally undeveloped and not well-positioned in national 
government—may exhibit greater responsiveness to citizens. These parties have fewer resources 
to attract voters (e.g., reputation, finance, access to public jobs, etc.) and to develop intra-party 
patronage relations. The scarcity of party resources may create conditions that are more 
favorable for responsiveness to citizens since local politicians must build their political 
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reputations and re-election chances by responding to the needs of their local constituencies rather 
than relying on support from their parties.  
To summarize, my theory of partisan accountability explains why strong parties may 
undermine local democratic performance in young electoral democracies. Organizational and 
electoral resources provide central party officials with credible patronage incentives at their 
disposal to punish members for disloyal behavior and reward party loyalty. This leads to a 
situation in which the accountability of local politicians to central party officials trumps their 
accountability to the electorate. The extensiveness of a party’s internal patronage machinery 
therefore serves as the mechanism through which strong parties undermine local democratic 
performance to increase their party’s political and economic power. This theoretical framework 
leads to the following hypothesis:  
H1: Strong parties undermine local democratic performance more than weak parties in electoral 
democracies.  
1.4. Case Selection and Background 
I test my theory in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter: BiH or Bosnia). BiH meets the 
scope conditions as an unconsolidated, electoral democracy in which corruption is widespread 
and parties are weakly or non-programmatic. In 2004, BiH’s regional entities adopted local 
democratic reforms which included a recall procedure for citizens to hold mayors accountable 
for their performance in government. This reform allows me to directly assess the performance 
of a formal institution of local direct democracy that ruling parties created to constrain and 
subject themselves to greater scrutiny by citizens. Furthermore, the division of the country into 
two highly autonomous regional entities whose party systems and ethnic composition differ, 
helps to rule out alternate explanations based on political competition and ethnic diversity. 
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Bosnia began its transition to democracy in 1995 as a result of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement, which concentrated constitutional powers in Bosnia’s two ethno-federal entities 
rather than at the state level.3 These entities, the Federation of BiH (Federation or FBiH) and 
Republika Srpska (RS) establish laws that regulate municipal governments in their respective 
entities.4  In 2004, the RS and FBiH parliaments reformed their election laws to allow citizens to 
directly elect mayors,5 while municipal counselors continue to be elected on a proportional basis 
through open lists.6 The new electoral law also introduced a recall mechanism giving citizens the 
chance to remove poor-performing mayors through a three-step process: initiation by a citizen 
petition or municipal counselors, local referendum, and early mayoral elections. Data on recall 
initiations is used to operationalize the dependent variable, so the procedures are discussed in 
detail in the following section.  
Figure 1: Decentralization in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
                                                 
3The DPA also established a small, multi-ethnic territory of equal administrative status called Brčko District. 
4The legal framework is largely the same in both entities. The main difference is that in FBiH, some municipal 
competencies are shared with cantonal governments (e.g., social services, education, and healthcare). 
5Previously, municipal counselors selected mayors, which meant that the mayor usually came from the party that 
obtained the most seats. In 2004, RS mayors were selected by first-past-the-post while FBiH used a preferential 
voting system that was changed to first-past-the-post in 2008. 
6Citizens may vote for individual candidates from the same party list and/or a party list. Seats are allocated by the 
Sainte-Lägue method in which parties must obtain at least 3% of total votes. Seats are allocated to candidates 
according to the number of personal votes they receive if above 5% of the total party vote (amended to 10% in 
2016). Remaining seats are allocated by the ranking of candidates on the party’s list. See Kapidžić (2016) for a 
discussion. 
Bi
H
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RS Municipalities
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Because of BiH’s complicated power-sharing institutions, its party system is segmented 
into three subsystems defined by ethnic group and entity. Bosniak-Muslim and Croat parties 
mainly compete for power in the Federation, in which the vast majority of Bosniaks and Croats 
reside. To accommodate these ethnic groups, FBiH is divided into ten cantons and below the 
cantonal level, 79 municipalities. Serb parties mainly compete in the RS, in which ethnic Serbs 
comprise 80% of the population.7 The RS is administratively centralized as its 62 municipalities 
are the only units below the entity level government. Table 3 displays the main parties in the RS 
with seat shares in the RS National Assembly and governing status of parties. Close seat shares 
between the main governing and opposition parties, stable coalitions, and all relevant parties 
having an ethnic Serb affiliation indicate that the party system of the RS can be characterized as 
competitive, electorally-stable, and ethnically homogenous. 
Table 3: Party Competition in the Republika Srpska 
        Party      Ethnic Pillar                             Seats in Parliament 
2003–2005    2006–2010    2011–2014       2015– 
DNS            Serb             3               4 (Gov.)         6 (Gov.)       8 (Gov.) 
PDP             Serb             9 (Gov.)              8                    7                   7 
SDS             Serb            26 (Gov.)            17                  18                 24 
SNSD          Serb            19             41 (Gov.)       37 (Gov.)     29 (Gov.)  
SP                Serb             3               3 (Gov.)         4 (Gov.)       5 (Gov.) 
Elections were held in Oct. 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014 
Data is from the Central Election Commission and RS Agency for Statistics. 
 
 
 
                                                 
7For a discussion, see: Mujagić and Arnautović (2016) and Šedo in Stojarová and Emerson (2010). 
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Table 4: Party Competition in Federation of BiH 
 
Party            Ethnic pillar                                                 Seats in Parliament 
2003-2006    2007-2010    2011-12      2013-14      2015 
 
SBB              Bosniak          –                   –                  13               13 (Gov.)    16 
SDP              Bosniak*       15                 17                 28 (Gov.)    28 (Gov.)    11 
SDA             Bosniak         32 (Gov.)      28 (Gov.)      23 (Gov.)   23                29 (Gov.) 
SBiH            Bosniak         15 (Gov.)      24 (Gov.)      9                 9                  3 
 
HDZ             Croat             16†(Gov.)     8†(Gov.)       12               12 (Gov.)    13†(Gov.) 
HDZ 1990    Croat              –                   7†(Gov.)       5†               5†(Gov.)     4 
HSP              Croat              1                   8†                 5†(Gov.)     5†               13† 
NSRzB         Croat              2                   3                   5 (Gov.)      5                 0 
* Formally multi-ethnic but appeals to moderate Bosniak voters. 
†Part of a pre-electoral coalition. 
Data is from the Central Election Commission and FBiH Agency for Statistics. 
 
By contrast, the Federation has a more complex system in which parties compete for the 
electoral support of one ethnic group but must form cross-ethnic coalitions once in office. Party 
competition amongst Bosniak parties is vibrant with alternation of governing parties and close 
seat shares compared to the Croat subsystem, in which HDZ is the dominant party but has 
needed the support of smaller Croat parties to maintain its dominance. Overall, inter-party 
competition in the Federation is more volatile and fragmented than in the RS, which has caused 
difficulties in coalition-building and led to unpredictable and unstable coalitions that have shifted 
within terms.  
Accordingly, existing literature would predict that greater party system stability and the 
lack of ethnic diversity in the RS would support democratic performance.8 In addition, the RS 
                                                 
8For example, Miguel (2004) and Miguel and Gugerty (2005) find that a shared national identity and lack of ethnic 
diversity foster local public goods provisioning in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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has a more centralized administrative structure in which municipalities are directly under the 
entity government, as opposed to the Federation in which contains ten cantons below the entity 
level. Finding similar patterns of accountability in both entities would therefore suggest that my 
theory is not dependent on the idiosyncrasies of a particular party system, ethnic composition, or 
the degree of decentralization. 
1.5. Operationalizing Local Democratic Performance and Party Strength 
Dependent Variable: Local democratic performance 
Local democratic performance refers to the representation of ordinary citizen interests in 
the implementation of policies, procedures, and decisions of municipal governments. This 
follows the same tradition as Putnam’s (1993) concept of institutional performance, which 
focused on how responsive and effective Italian regional governments were to citizens through 
policy processes, pronouncements and implementation. I measure the dependent variable as 
supporting or undermining local democratic performance. These evaluations are based on two 
dimensions that reflect procedural and substantive representation: 1. Political processes follow 
democratic principles enshrined in formal rules; 2. Programmatic linkage exists between 
politicians and voters, meaning that voters reward and sanction politicians based on public policy 
outputs.  
The data used to measure this variable relates to a specific institution of local direct 
democracy: recalls against mayors. Formally, recalls are an accountability mechanism for 
citizens to sanction mayors for their performance in government. They consist of three 
successive stages:   
1. Initiation by a citizen petition signed by 10% of residents or by one-third of 
municipal counselors. 
2. Local Referendum in which citizens vote in favor or against the recall, 
determined by a simple majority.  
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3. Early election in which citizens vote for a new mayor, elected according to first-
past-the-post.  
I collected and hand-coded quantitative and qualitative data for each stage, which I obtained 
from the archives of the Central Election Commission of BiH, an online media archive, NGO 
and IGO reports, and more than sixty interviews with local politicians, political experts, and 
other local stakeholders.9  
The initiation stage contains qualitative data on democratic procedures and programmatic 
linkages. Based on these dimensions, I develop a conceptual typology to operationalize local 
democratic performance. According to formal rules, only citizens or municipal counselors may 
initiate recalls. This engenders the principal-agent relationship of democratic representation: 
Citizens, acting directly or through their local representatives (municipal counselors), act as 
principals to sanction their political agents (mayors). However, my theory of partisan 
accountability predicts that central-level party officials may also influence local government 
performance by coopting local intermediaries, such as municipal counselors. The influence of 
political actors at higher levels of government on recall initiation perverts the principal-agent 
relationship, turning central party officials into principals who co-opt municipal counselors into 
their sanctioning agents. To operationalize this dimension, the rows of the typology include three 
possible initiators: citizens, municipal counselors, and central party officials. Next, the columns 
indicate the initiator’s motivation for recalling the mayor. I account for two possibilities: 
dissatisfaction with the mayor’s policy output, which corresponds to programmatic linkage 
                                                 
9Qualitative sources are listed in Appendix 2 and include: Mediacentar Sarajevo, infobiro.ba; Center for Civil 
Initiatives (2009), Odnos načelnika i skupština u BiH, http://www.cci.ba; US Delegation in Sarajevo, 3/20/2007, 
Bosnia—The Perilous Politics of Recall Initiatives, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07SARAJEVO615_a.html. 
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between mayors and citizens and is therefore supportive of local democratic performance. The 
other possibility is that initiators sanction mayors for political reasons and to gain control over 
municipal governments.  
Table 5: Recall Initiation and Local Democratic Performance 
Initiator’s Motivation 
 
Political Interests                                 Policy Output 
(undermines performance)                      (supports performance) 
 
Citizens          Clientelism/ Charisma/Partisanship                     Direct Democracy 
(0 cases)                                                  (0 cases) 
 
Municipal                     Personal Vendetta                            Representative Democracy 
Counselors                          (6 cases)                                                  (2 cases) 
 
Central Party/          Partisan Accountability                               Policy Correction 
Politicians                          (18 cases)                                                 (0 cases) 
 
 
Table 5 presents the conceptual typology for the dependent variable. The cells correspond 
to six possible mechanisms by which politicians support or undermine local democratic 
performance. The cells in the right-hand column support local democratic performance, as 
sanctioning is based on policy outputs. The top-right cell follows a model of direct democracy in 
which citizens initiate a recall to remove a mayor because of his public policies. The middle-
right cell indicates a representative democratic model in which municipal counselors initiate a 
recall against a mayor whose policies they did not approve. In the bottom right cell, central party 
officials sanction mayors. Although this does not follow formal rules, one could imagine a 
hypothetical situation in which a mayor’s policies are not representative of citizen interests, but 
citizens and counselors are unable to sanction the mayor due to collective action problems or 
repressive local governments. In this scenario, involvement from higher levels of government 
would be supportive of local performance as a form of policy correction.  
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The left columns indicate sanctioning was done for political interests, which undermines 
democratic performance. In the top-left cell, citizens sanction mayors because of political 
interests rather than policy outputs. This implies some type of non-programmatic linkage such as 
clientelism, charismatic appeal, or partisan attachment. In the middle-left column, municipal 
counselors initiate due to a political vendetta against the mayor. Finally, if central party officials 
influence recall initiation for political reasons, this implies partisan accountability in which 
central party officials co-opt municipal counselors into formally initiating the recall for partisan, 
rather than citizen, interests. 
In total, 26 recalls were initiated between 2005 and 2015.10 I include the number of cases 
in parentheses in the typology to illustrate that the observed cases are distributed unevenly across 
three of the six cells. Strikingly, only two cases support democratic performance, whereas 24 
undermine performance. Furthermore, no recall was initiated by a citizen petition, which 
provides strong evidence that citizens are not the main driving force behind recalls. Six cases 
were initiated by municipal counselors acting on their own volition. However, the bulk of the 
cases, 18, involve central party officials or politicians who led recall initiatives through the 
partisan accountability mechanism. In the empirical analysis section, I unpack and compare the 
three mechanisms in the typology for which there are observed cases. I examine how 
partisanship influences these mechanisms and the specific types of conflicts between mayors and 
initiators.  
An objection might be raised that recalls, even if prompted by central party officials, are 
not necessarily inimical to local democratic performance. However, it is clear both theoretically 
                                                 
10Recalls were legally adopted in 2004 and may not take place during local election years. Local elections took place 
in 2004, 2008, and 2016. 
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and empirically that almost all cases do undermine democracy. Theoretically, it is difficult to 
imagine that the involvement of central level actors in recall initiations would support the 
decision-making autonomy of municipal counselors and have no influence over citizens in recall 
referenda. This theoretical notion is supported empirically. I demonstrate this using 26 cases that 
were coded based on multiple qualitative data sources and were cross-checked for each 
individual case. Indeed it is remarkable that evidence from more than 60 semi-structured 
interviews,11 more than 100 print and televised media reports, NGO reports and U.S. diplomatic 
cables concur that in the vast majority of cases, politicians initiate recalls for political gain rather 
than to remove mayors whose policies harm their local communities.  
Independent Variable: Party Strength 
Party strength is not a widely used concept in the literature, but scholars routinely refer to 
a party’s organizational and electoral strength. I conceptualize the overall strength of a party 
according to its wealth of organizational and electoral resources, and I measure them using 
standard indicators corresponding to party finance, local branches, seat shares, and governing 
status.12 My sample consists of fifteen parties that were included if they were involved in recall 
initiations, plus parties that won at least five mayoral mandates.  
Organizational Resources  
The indicators for organizational resources include party finance and extensiveness of 
local party branches. I measure party finance by averaging the party’s annual income from 2012 
                                                 
11Interviewees included mayors, municipal counselors, municipal employees, journalists, academics, representatives 
from NGOs and IGOs stationed in Bosnia and are listed in Appendix 2. 
12Party membership data is unreliable and not available for many parties in BiH. 
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to 2015. This period was chosen because it comprises a full political budget cycle13 and because 
some of the younger parties in the dataset did not exist prior to 2012. Party finance ranges from a 
low of approximately 300 euros per year to a high of 2 million euros per year, and is highly 
dispersed with a mean that is almost twice that of the median. Therefore I establish a scale of 
zero to indicate low finance if the average income is below 50,000 euros. If it is between 50,000 
and 500,000 euros it receives a score of one, and if it is above 500,000 euros it gets a score of 
two, corresponding to high finance. This scaling reduces the variance and skewness of the data, 
and is highly correlated with the raw finance scores at 0.79, significant at the 0.001 level.  
The next two indicators deal with organizational extensiveness. First I calculate the 
number of municipal party branches. While some parties have branches in all 141 municipalities, 
others have established branches in only a couple of localities. For some small parties, 
information was not available, so I estimated by referring to local election results to see in which 
municipalities a party fielded candidates and/or which local branches were mentioned in their 
financial reports. To deal with imprecise data for smaller parties, I score a party as zero if it has 
fewer than 20 branches, one if it has between 20 and 50, and two if it has more than 50. Since 
there are 62 municipalities in the RS and 79 in FBiH, this coding decision seems reasonable 
without being overly rigid. Second, I look at the territorial dispersion of local branches: Does a 
party have branches in both entities (score of two), are they dispersed across one entity (score of 
one), or concentrated in one locality or canton (score of zero)?  
To demonstrate convergent validity, pairwise correlations amongst the three indicators 
for party organization are 0.67, 0.72, and 0.77, all significant at below the 0.01 level. Since the 
                                                 
13Local elections were held in 2012 and 2016, while general elections took place in 2014. 
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three variables are equal in theoretical importance and the range of correlations is small, I add 
the three scores to reach an aggregate score for party organizational strength that ranges from 
zero to six. Party finance data was collected from the Central Election Commission of BiH, as 
registered political parties are required by law to submit yearly financial reports to this state 
institution. Data on local branches comes from party websites and consultations with party 
officials; coding decisions are listed in Appendix 4.  
Electoral Resources 
The second component of party resources is electoral strength at the entity level. Since 
both entities allocate seats according to the same method, I measure this component by the 
number of seats a party won in the RS or FBiH (lower house) parliament and a dummy variable 
to indicate whether the party was part of the governing coalition in each year between 2005 and 
2015. 14 I do not aggregate electoral and organizational scores together since organizational 
strength could not be measured over time. Instead I analyze these components separately, which 
allows me to evaluate whether they have independent effects on local democratic performance. 
Table 6 gives an overview of the parties that won mayoral mandates in BiH from 2004 to 
2015. They are ordered by entity, ethnic affiliation, number of mayoral mandates won, 
organizational strength, average number of seats won in entity parliament,15 number of years the 
party was part of the governing coalition from 2003 to 2015, and a nominal score indicating 
overall strength. In the RS, SNSD and SDS are the two strongest parties with SNSD leading the 
                                                 
14Electoral data was collected from the following sources: Analitika—My Place, http://www.mojemjesto.ba/en/; 
Center for Civil Initiatives. “Monitoring Rada Parlamenta Federacije BiH 2010-2014,” http://www.cci.ba; Central 
Election Commission of BiH, izbori.ba; Federation Agency for Statistics. http://fzs.ba/; RS Agency for Statistics. 
http://www.rzs.rs.ba/. Sources are listed in Appendix 2. 
15General elections were held in October 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014. 
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RS government and SDS leading the opposition. Together they have contributed 170 of the 204 
mayoral mandates in this entity. In FBiH SDA, SDP, and HDZ, are the three strongest parties 
which have contributed 203 of the 251 mayoral mandates in this entity. 
Table 6: Party Strength in BiH 
Party             Entity    Ethnicity    Mayors     Org.        Seats*      Governing**    Overall 
(count)    (total)    (average)         (years)         Strength 
 
SDS               RS          Serb            87            5              21                   2             Strong 
SNSD            RS          Serb            83            6              32                  11            Strong  
DNS              RS          Serb             7             3               5                   11            Weak  
SP                  RS          Serb             7             3               3                   11            Weak  
PDP               RS          Serb             2             4               8                    2             Weak  
NDP              RS          Serb             2             2               5                    0             Weak  
SNS               RS          Serb             1             2               0                    0             Weak  
ZSD               RS          Serb             2             0               0                    0             Weak  
Other             RS             –              13          0–2           0–4                  0              Weak 
 
Total               RS             –             204           6              83                  13 
 
SDA              FBiH     Bosniak        117           6              28                  11            Strong  
SDP              FBiH     Bosniak         30            6              18                   4             Strong  
SBiH             FBiH     Bosniak          8             5              13                   7             Weak*** 
HDZ             FBiH       Croat           56            5              12                  11            Strong  
HDZ 1990    FBiH       Croat            8             3               5                    6             Weak  
HSS-NHI      FBiH       Croat            3             0               3                    0             Weak  
SNSD           FBiH        Serb             8             4               1                    0             Weak  
Other            FBiH           –              21          0–4          0–15              0–3.5          Weak 
Total             FBiH           –             251           6              98                  13 
 
*Average number of seats obtained in RS or FBiH (lower house) parliament in 2002, 2006, 2010, 
and 2014, for years that party existed. 
**Number of years in governing coalition in RS or FBiH parliament, 2003-2015. 
***Party has declined dramatically in electoral strength since 2010. 
 
Covariates 
To account for alternative explanations that electoral competition positively influences 
democratic performance, I include the mayor’s margin of victory over the second place candidate 
in the previous election as a measure of local competitiveness. I also control for electoral 
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stability of the party system by coding the entity to which the municipality belongs, since inter-
party competition in the RS is stable, while in FBiH it is more volatile. Finally, I include the 
ethnic affiliation of the initiating and mayor’s parties to account for whether political conflicts 
are ethnic in nature, as ethnic identity is a highly politicized feature embedded in Bosnia’s 
institutions and party system. 
Structure of Empirical Analysis 
Since a total of 26 recalls were initiated, the main disadvantage of the data is that the sample 
is small, making quantitative inferences difficult. The main advantage of the data, however, is 
that it includes rich, within-case qualitative information that allows me to distinguish different 
types of conflicts and trace causal mechanisms. To assess whether recall initiations fit my theory 
of partisan accountability, I build on the conceptual typology presented above by replacing the 
motivation of the initiators with their party affiliations in relation to the mayor. This leads me to 
identify five specific types of conflicts which help to sub-classify the cases that undermine local 
democratic performance and to distinguish them from the two cases that support performance. I 
then examine variations in the party strength of initiators by conflict type to determine whether 
party strength is associated with specific types of conflicts and mechanisms. I include two 
detailed case studies that illustrate how partisan accountability works similarly under different 
local partisan configurations and in different entities. Evidence that strong parties initiate recalls 
for partisan interests would support my claim that strong parties undermine local democratic 
performance for political power. By contrast, I expect weak parties to lack the resources to 
meddle into the affairs of local governments, so a lack of partisan interference by weak parties in 
recalls would also support my hypothesis.  
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1.6. Results 
Overall, recalls undermine local democratic performance. They are most frequently 
subverted by strong parties through the mechanism of partisan accountability. In this section I 
discuss the evidence for these claims and I demonstrate that the way recalls function in practice 
is far from how they are spelled out by law.  
Table 7: Political Conflicts between Mayors and Initiators 
Initiator’s Party Affiliation in relation to Mayor 
 
Same          Different                    Multiple Parties 
(undermines performance)         (supports performance) 
 
 
Municipal            local              local                             quality of 
Counselors         factions      competition                      governance 
 
(1 case)         (5 cases)                          (2 cases) 
 
 
Central Party/     intra-party     inter-party 
Politicians        discipline     competition 
 
(4 cases)       (14 cases) 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 presents the impact of partisanship on conflict type for the observed cases, which 
are now classified by the initiators and their partisan affiliation in relation to the mayor. Since no 
recall was initiated by a citizen petition, this row no longer appears. Table 7 reveals five patterns 
of conflict that correspond to undermining (columns one and two) or supporting local democratic 
performance (column 3). In the two cases that support local performance, no single party 
dominated the initiation effort. Conflict between the mayor and municipal counselors was over 
the quality of governance and led counselors from multiple parties to sanction the mayor. With 
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the exception of one case,16 the initiations that undermined performance do not share this 
characteristic of party pluralism: Instead, one party clearly led the initiation effort. The second 
column shows that in nineteen of these cases, the lead initiators were from a different party than 
the mayor, which I refer to as inter-party conflict. These initiations served to extend competition 
for the mayorship. The first column displays a total of five intra-party conflicts in which the 
mayor’s own party tried to remove him from office as a form of punishment. It is striking to note 
that only six recalls that undermined local democratic performance involved a purely local-level 
conflict between mayors and municipal counselors, as shown in the middle row. By contrast, the 
bottom row shows that the vast majority, eighteen cases or 69%, involved directives from central 
party officials. In the next sections, I discuss how these eighteen cases follow the partisan 
accountability mechanism, regardless of whether they are inter or intra-party conflicts. I begin by 
discussing intra-party conflicts (column 1), followed by inter-party conflicts (column 2), and I 
compare them to the two cases that supported local performance. 
 Recalls as Punishment: Intra-party conflict and maintaining political control 
Figure 2 illustrates the strength of the parties that initiated the five cases of intra-party 
conflict, corresponding to the first column in Table 7.  The y-axis contains scores for the party’s 
organizational strength which range from 0 to 6. A horizontal line is placed at 3, which is the 
median score for the parties in the dataset (mean is 3.5). The x-axis represents whether the party 
was part of the RS or FBiH governing coalition at the time of the recall. The space to the left side 
of the vertical line represents parties that were not in government at the time of the recall while 
to the right of the line are governing parties. The letters refer to the individual cases of recall 
initiation, and the full dataset is included in Appendix 3. The figure is unequivocal that the 
                                                 
16Case M was the only local inter-party conflict that was initiated by multiple parties.  
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parties who initiated recalls against their co-partisan mayors (SDA and SNSD) were the 
organizationally and electorally strongest their respective entity.  
 
Figure 2: Party Strength in Recalls Initiated by Mayor’s Party 
 
Case D (Bosanska Krupa) is the lone intra-party conflict that was local in nature, caused 
by local party factions which pit the mayor against the initiating counselors from his party.17 The 
four other cases follow the partisan accountability mechanism: Central party officials from 
strong parties sought to punish dissident mayors by directing their co-partisan municipal 
counselors to initiate recalls. In case J (Kneževo), the party president of SNSD publicly gave his 
support for the recall. Although unsuccessful in 2007, this turned out only to be the first out of 
three recall attempts against this mayor.18 Case L (Vlasenica) was also initiated by SNSD 
                                                 
17The disagreement was over the formation of a cantonal coalition which the mayor supported but initiating 
counselors opposed. 
18After the first initiation the mayor switched parties and was re-elected. The other initiations against this mayor are 
cases U and X.  
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counselors, but failed as the Central Election Commission of BiH found the process of absentee 
voting in the referendum to be illegal. In cases R and Y, Banovići and Milići, the conflict 
involved a valuable natural resource (coal and bauxite mining, respectively). Both mayors came 
into conflict with local economic notables who control these mining companies and who have 
strong ties to the central leadership of the mayor’s party. Intra-party recalls are not associated 
with the degree of local political competition, as the mayor’s margin of victory over the second 
place candidate in the previous election ranges from one to 51 percentage points. 
Case R, Banovići, a medium sized, coal-mining town in the Federation that is an SDA 
stronghold, illustrates how strong parties punish dissident mayors who are responsive to 
community needs over partisan interests.19 This town’s highly profitable, semi-public coal mine 
employs approximately 3,000 workers (out of a total population of 23,300) and has an annual 
budget of 90 million euros. The former SDA mayor, a professional engineer in his third term, 
was recalled because he gave signals to a prominent economic and political notable that he 
disagreed with the removal of an individual from the party’s municipal board and that he was 
concerned with the management and financial sustainability of the coal mine. The local notable 
is the former managing director of the mine and a highly influential figure amongst SDA’s 
central party leadership. With support from the party’s leadership, the notable embarked on an 
aggressive campaign not only to remove the mayor from office, but also to destroy his personal 
and professional reputation and to physically threaten anyone who associated him or herself with 
the mayor. This included coopting SDA municipal counselors to initiate the recall and coercing 
the mayor’s own family members and members of the local Muslim community (in which the 
                                                 
19Data sources and references for this case study are listed in Appendix 2 and include a ninety minute interview with 
the former mayor in 2016. 
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mayor had been actively involved) to vote in favor of the recall in the referendum. Through 
monitoring and credible punishment incentives, the party was able to make an example out of the 
mayor and deter other party members from acting independently of party interests.  
According to the former mayor, the mine is currently 50 million euros in debt with 
injuries and accidents on the rise, yet they are pushed under the carpet. In addition, a law 
professor who warned the municipal government of these issues was also threatened by the 
party, while mining inspectors do not report negative findings for fear of losing their jobs.  The 
local notable responsible for mobilizing the party against the mayor has moved up the ranks of 
SDA, serving as president of the cantonal branch, vice president of the party, and MP in the 
Federation. In sum, this case study is paradigmatic of the way in which strong parties use 
patronage resources to subvert recalls into an informal means to punish disloyal mayors who put 
the interests of citizens ahead of their party’s economic and political interests. By removing 
dissident mayors and replacing them with docile party members, strong parties maintain their 
political and economic control over municipal resources, and this logic of intra-party recalls 
applies across both entities. 
Recalls as Competition: Inter-Party Conflict and Extending Political Control 
In the nineteen cases where the initiating party differs from the mayor’s party, the 
initiators used recalls to extend electoral competition for the mayorship. In five cases, 
competition was local and personal in nature, such as a counselor attempting to take over the 
mayor’s position. However, in the other fourteen cases, central party officials took the lead in 
initiating recalls against mayors from rival parties. Their goal was to establish partisan control 
over municipal governments. 
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(a) Mayor Party Strength                                    (b) Initiating Party Strength 
Figure 3: Party Strength in Recalls caused by Inter-Party Conflict 
 
Figures 3a and 3b present the cases of inter-party conflicts involving central party 
officials, with party strength of the mayor’s party and the initiating party, respectively. While the 
strength of the mayor’s party varies greatly, the initiating parties were organizationally strong 
(score of 5 or 6) and were the leaders of the government or opposition coalition at the time, 
having the largest or second largest seat shares in parliament (SNSD and SDS in the RS, and 
SDP in FBiH).  In cases O and V, the strong opposition party SDS led recall initiatives against 
SNSD mayors, who represent its rival party in control of the RS government. SNSD in turn 
initiated recalls against SDS mayors in cases F, G, K, P, and U. Figures 4a and 4b show that 
these two strong parties also initiated six recalls in the RS against mayors from organizationally 
weaker parties. Cases B, H, and X were initiated against mayors from parties that were part of 
the RS governing coalition, and SNSD initiated two of these recalls (H and X) against its own 
coalition partners. In addition, SNSD initiated cases C, T, and Z against mayors from weak 
parties with no substantial representation in the RS legislature.  
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The evidence runs contrary to alternative explanations which predict that political 
competition should be associated with better local democratic performance: Inter-party recalls 
occurred in robust to moderately competitive local environments. The margin of victory of the 
mayor over the second place candidate in the previous mayoral election ranges from 0.29 to 
16.87 percentage points, with a mean of 7.15 and median of 6.98.20 It is noteworthy that only one 
case occurred in the Federation while thirteen occurred in the RS, which suggests that inter-party 
recalls are not a major mechanism that parties employ to compete for control over municipal 
governments in the Federation. This finding also goes against the competition and party system 
institutionalization literature which would expect the RS party system to be more supportive of 
democratic performance because electoral competition in this entity is more stable than in the 
Federation.  
I also address an alternative explanation that inter-party recalls initiated by central party 
officials are not compatible with partisan accountability if the initiating party caters to the policy 
preferences of the local community more than the mayor’s party. In BiH, party cleavages are not 
based on policy programs but rather on ethnicity and patronage jobs. In only one case was the 
initiating party from a different ethnic group than the mayor’s party (see footnote 27). This 
means that in all other cases, if a citizen favored the initiating party it is most likely because she 
perceived the party to improve her employment prospects rather than because the party had a 
different policy orientation (see Jansen, Brkovic, and Celebicic, 2017, Chapters 7-8). 
Case H, which occurred in 2007 in the medium-sized municipality of Foča, serves as an 
illustrative example of how strong parties undermine democratic performance. It also explains 
                                                 
20By contrast the mean for non-interparty conflict is 16.37 and median is 9.83. 
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the logic of an inter-party conflict between two governing parties (SP and SNSD) with different 
organizational capacities.21 In 2004 the new SP mayor was elected by a slim margin of 1.8 
percentage points. As he began his first term, Foča was under international sanctions because 
numerous indicted war criminals were living at-large in the municipality.  Through the mayor’s 
commitment to upholding the rule of law and building a more ethnically tolerant environment 
(e.g., rebuilding housing for Bosniaks to encourage refugee returns), sanctions against the town 
were eventually lifted. The mayor also attempted to create a more responsible local 
administration by reducing his own salary and the salaries of municipal counselors, and he 
managed several large public projects such as rebuilding the town’s cultural center, local 
infrastructure, and a recreational water park. During two separate interviews with the mayor in 
2014 and 2016, he stated that the reason for the conflict was that his policies which focused on 
providing local public goods, improving the efficiency of public administration, engaging with 
the international community, and integrating ethnic minorities, challenged the political status-
quo: Political elites at higher levels of government felt threatened by the positive attention this 
mayor was receiving from both the local and international communities. 
At the time of the recall, the SNSD leadership was reveling in its electoral success after 
the 2006 general elections. Following instructions of the party president who also served as 
prime minister of the RS, SNSD counselors forged a local coalition with SDS, the party which 
held the most seats in Foča’s municipal council. No matter that the two parties had been bitter 
rivals at the entity and state levels for ten years, their municipal counselors banded together to 
initiate a recall against the maverick SP mayor, who had narrowly won the mayoral elections 
                                                 
21Data sources and references for this case study are listed in Appendix 2 and include two 90-minute interviews with 
the former mayor in 2014 and 2016. 
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three years earlier and came from SNSD’s weaker counterpart in government. This recall attempt 
ultimately failed because the Central Election Commission found voter registration in the 
referendum stage to be illegal.  Subsequently, SNSD’s party leader personally threatened the 
mayor and publicly slandered him. This strategy eventually worked, as SP revoked the mayor’s 
party membership in 2010, and he lost the 2012 and 2016 mayoral elections after forming a new 
party.  
 
(a) Mayor Party Strength                                    (b) Initiating Party Strength 
Figure 4: Party Strength in Recalls related to Local Conflicts 
 
When strong parties initiated recalls, they did it exclusively through the partisan 
accountability mechanism by exerting pressure from the central leadership down to municipal 
counselors. By contrast, figures 4a and 4b show that strong parties did not lead any of the five 
initiations in which inter-party conflict was purely local in nature.22 Instead, local conflicts 
between mayors and municipal counselors from different parties occur in fiercely competitive 
environments in which the mayor’s margin of victory from the previous election was less than 
                                                 
22Case M is the exception in which multiple parties initiated a recall against the mayor, so party strength refers to the 
largest party in the municipal council. 
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ten percentage points. The absence of initiators from strong parties and the fact that counselors 
from parties that were weaker than the mayor’s party initiated recalls in cases A and E reflects 
the personal, rather than partisan, nature of these local political conflicts. This pattern also holds 
for the two cases that support local democratic performance, below. Namely, the same weak 
party that initiated in case A also participated in initiating case S, in which it became the 
successor party after the removal of the incumbent.23  
 
(a) Mayor Party Strength                                     (b) Initiating Party Strength 
Figure 5: Party Strength in Recalls related to Poor Governance 
 
The analysis of recall initiations has shown that in practice, recalls do not support local 
democratic performance. Moreover, no recall was initiated directly by a citizen petition and only 
two out of 26 initiations relate to policy outputs that were harmful to citizen interests. The other 
24 cases were initiated for political interests and undermined the accountability of mayors to 
citizens. Strong parties led initiation efforts eighteen times due to an intra-party or inter-party 
conflict. Using the mechanism of partisan accountability, central party officials from these 
                                                 
23Since no party dominated the initiation effort in these cases, figure 5b displays the largest party in the council for 
W (same as mayor’s) and the successor party for S (case W was unsuccessful and S was successful). 
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parties activated their patronage networks in their attempts to punish disloyal mayors from their 
own ranks or to dislodge mayors from rival parties. In doing so, strong parties subvert the 
performance of this local democratic institution by manipulating recalls into a means to increase 
partisan control over municipal governments. Although weak parties are not immune from 
abusing recalls for political gain, they do so less frequently than strong parties and are involved 
in more benign forms of conflict (i.e. personalistic feuds that are restricted to the local-level).   
In contrast to alternative explanations, I find scant evidence that ethnicity plays a role in 
partisan conflict: In the 19 recalls that were initiated due to inter-party or local conflicts, case C 
was the only instance in which incumbent and initiating parties represented different ethnic 
groups, and the conflicts centered on establishing political control.24 Finally, the results also 
show substantial differences between the two regional entities which contradict explanations 
based on competition and party system institutionalization. Although conventional wisdom 
would predict the fragmented and volatile party system of FBiH to be more at risk of 
undermining democratic performance, the majority of recalls occurred in the RS. Moreover, only 
seven initiations occurred in FBiH, and only one of these was successful. This suggests that 
greater party system consolidation and centralized administrative structure in the RS may be 
more conducive for partisan accountability. The ten cantonal governments in FBiH, on the other 
hand, may strain the ability of central party leaders to control or co-opt local actors. Furthermore, 
the competitive but volatile Bosniak subsystem may inhibit recalls by making it difficult for 
                                                 
24Case C occurred in Osmaci, one of three municipalities in the RS without an ethnic Serb majority. Inter-party 
conflict was initiated by SNSD which formed a coalition with Serb counselors from PDP, SDS, SP, and Serbian 
Radical Party against a Bosniak mayor from SDA. Counselors took advantage of a new voter registration loophole 
that prevented Bosniak voters from voting in absentia, and the referendum was boycotted by Bosniaks. This led to 
the successful removal of the mayor (The case is detailed in the following media reports: “Srbi traže referendum 
kako bi smijenili načelnika Edina Ramića,” 5 Nov 2006, Oslobođenje; “Građani izglasali opoziv načelnika,” 14 Nov 
2006, Nezavisne novine; “Ramić: Ovo je nastavak etničkog čišćenja,” 15 Nov 2006 Dnevni Avaz). 
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parties to identify whether mayors from different parties are allies or rivals. The Croat 
subsystem—the least competitive in which HDZ has maintained its hegemony during the entire 
period—experienced only one recall that involved two weaker parties.  
1.7. Discussion 
When Bosnia’s regional entities reformed their electoral laws in 2004 to allow citizens to 
directly elect their mayors and recall poor-performing ones, international actors overseeing the 
political development of the country hailed this achievement as an institutional reform that 
would strengthen local democracy (Council of Europe 2004, OSCE 2005). Yet more than a 
decade later, the analysis of recalls contradicts this notion by showing that the same 
parliamentary parties which created this institutional mechanism have also subverted its formal 
purpose and turned it into a means to consolidate power at the expense of local community 
interests. The evidence suggests that recall initiations are not based on the quality of governance 
but rather on political conflicts with mayors and the calculations of organizationally and 
electorally strong political parties in their quest to extend control over subnational units. 
Contrary to existing literature, I find no evidence that political competition constrains strong 
parties from undermining the performance of this local democratic institution, nor is the 
institutionalization of the party system associated with greater respect for local democracy.  
By applying patron-client politics inside of parties, this work has presented an alternative 
mechanism that connects party resources to greater capacities and incentives to subvert local 
democratic institutions. Partisan accountability also extends beyond recalls. For example, in BiH 
the mechanism can be easily traced to other types of intra-party punishments against mayors, 
including forced resignations, politically-motivated criminal indictments, and demotions and 
revocations of party membership. Although there is not a large body of research on recalls in 
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other developing contexts, recent findings from Peru—a country in which more than 5,000 
recalls were initiated between 1997 and 2013—suggest that recalls have similarly pernicious 
effects. In this context, weak institutional rules and a highly fragmented party system have fueled 
personalistic conflicts, often between mayors and losing mayoral candidates from the previous 
election (Welp 2016). Even in Poland’s model of local direct democracy, which is considered a 
successful example, recalls have been politicized with opposition parties mobilizing citizens in 
the effort to eject local politicians (Piasecki 2011). It would therefore be informative to better 
understand the conditions under which strong parties are a virtue, supporting instead of 
undermining the enforcement of formal institutions that entrench the quality of democratic 
governance. Studying the interaction between the nature of party systems and the level of 
democratic consolidation may tell us when strong parties are likely to help or harm democratic 
development.  
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2. HOW STRONG PARTIES UNDERMINE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION  
 
Abstract 
How do strong, resource-rich parties affect political participation, and what impact do their 
electoral strategies have on the representation of citizen interests? The previous chapter 
demonstrated that strong parties initiate recalls as a political strategy to concentrate their power 
over municipal governments. This chapter examines the determinants of recall success. Using a 
non-parametric, tree-based machine learning method, I find that low voter turnout optimally 
predicts recall referendum success, suggesting that parties engage in direct electoral manipulation 
or indirectly lower participation by perpetuating a political environment of low trust. The results 
are supported with qualitative data. Furthermore, every time incumbent mayors were removed, the 
initiating party took control over the mayorship. The evidence supports the notion that the 
resources of strong parties provide capacities to undermine local democracy, while permissive 
institutional rules incentivize them to recall mayors as a strategy to extend political control. The 
broader effect of recalls is to reduce political participation, which stifles subnational 
democratization. 
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2.1. Introduction 
To what extent are parties that initiate recalls for political gain successful in their 
strategies and why? Furthermore, how do the strategies affect democratic representation? In the 
previous chapter, I presented my theoretical framework of partisan accountability and argued 
that strong parties undermine democratic accountability. I demonstrated this by analyzing recalls 
initiated against mayors. Rather than initiators attempting to hold mayors accountable for poor 
governance, I found most initiations to be indicative of political strategies to extend control over 
municipal governments.  In this chapter, I look at how successful these strategies are and 
whether they support or undermine the integrity of local elections to serve as a mechanism of 
democratic accountability.   
Political participation is an essential ingredient if democracies are to fulfill their principal 
goal of responding to the interests of their citizens. Scholars have long discussed the importance 
of effective participation, and in doing so they have constructed influential theories, including 
polyarchy (Dahl 1971), political agency (O’Donnell 2010), and efficacy (Pateman 1970). Yet 
democracies are known to exhibit electoral malpractices that reduce the effectiveness of political 
participation (Norris 2014).  Levitsky and Way (2010) distinguished electoral democracies from 
competitive-authoritarian regimes by the existence of a relatively level playing field between 
incumbent and opposition parties, so that opposition parties can meaningfully compete and 
organize between elections. Competitive elections thus present a genuine threat to ruling parties 
in electoral democracies. Even if politicians in electoral democracies are more constrained than 
their authoritarian counterparts in the coercive measures at their disposal, they have strong 
incentives to find alternative ways to tip elections to their advantage.  
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The competitive strategies of ruling parties in democracies may therefore undermine the 
effectiveness of political participation, either directly or indirectly. Existing literature on 
electoral fraud in democracies has focused on vote-buying and turnout-buying as the most 
important forms of electoral manipulation that strong, clientelistic party machines implement to 
enhance turnout (Stokes 2005, Nichter 2008, Szwarcberg 2012). Recent work has also shown 
that parties in clientelistic democracies use different combinations of manipulation (Gans-Morse 
et al. 2014). Less research has been devoted to understanding how electoral manipulation might 
also reduce voter turnout in elections (Cox and Kousser 1981, Simpser 2012), although some 
scholarship has found that corruption and low political trust stifle participation in elections 
(Birch 2010, Ceka 2012, Chong et al. 2014). 
My work focuses on how the mixture of parties’ active and passive electoral strategies 
influence democratic representation at subnational levels. My theory of partisan accountability 
predicts that strong parties use their electoral and organizational resources to further party elite 
interests rather than the interests of their constituents. In regard to elections, I argue that low 
voter turnout benefits clientelistic party machines when it is limited to their loyal clientele, and 
when greater turnout would dilute the proportion of party supporters. Weak parties, on the other 
hand, prefer broader turnout which includes citizens who vote on the basis of policy 
performance.  
When greater turnout gives weak parties an electoral advantage and elections are 
competitive, strong parties are likely to pursue strategies that suppress turnout. They can actively 
manipulate elections as the opportunity arises while passively promoting a political environment 
of mass disillusionment in which most citizens choose not to participate because they perceive 
politicians as corrupt and do not view elections as a realistic way to discipline politicians. Low 
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participation in elections is particularly problematic for the functioning of democracy when 
turnout is not representative of the whole population. 
My results are consistent with these expectations. Using a tree-based machine learning 
method, I find that mayors are most likely to be removed from office when fewer citizens vote in 
recall referenda. Furthermore, I provide qualitative evidence to show that reductions in turnout 
are frequently and directly linked to manipulative practices such as restrictions on voter 
registration and absentee balloting. The evidence suggests that strong parties achieve greater 
overall success in removing mayors who threaten party interests from office simply because they 
initiate recalls more often: Party resources provide capacities, while permissive institutional rules 
provide pernicious incentives for strong parties to initiate recalls even when success is uncertain. 
Taken as a whole, the direct and indirect effects of the strategies of strong parties suppress 
turnout in recall referenda and harm subnational democracy. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. First I explain how electoral participation contributes to 
democratic representation both normatively and empirically. I review the main forms of electoral 
manipulation in democratic regimes and their effects on political trust and electoral participation. 
Next I explain my theoretical framework in which I illustrate how partisan accountability acts as 
a coordination mechanism between central party elites and party affiliates in the periphery to turn 
capacities and incentives of strong parties into strategies. Following this, I show how these 
strategies affect political participation, particularly in the post-Communist context. Employing a 
classification tree, I then present my findings on the factors that optimally predict recall success. 
I complement the findings with qualitative data and results from early mayoral elections. I 
conclude with a discussion on the impact of party strength and how passive electoral 
manipulation may result in the suppression of citizen voice. 
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2.2. Participation and Manipulation in Democratic Elections 
Schumpeter’s (1942) classic work views democracy as a procedure of regularized 
elections enabling citizens to choose their leaders and evict them, which continues to be regarded 
as democracy’s defining attribute. A voluminous literature has extended Schumpeter’s notion to 
cover the underlying substantive conditions that enable elections to be free and fair. 
Normatively, democratic theory and international human rights treaties identify the principle of 
equal and effective participation as a basic condition for citizens to have opportunities to 
articulate their preferences and to make them count (Pateman 1970, Dahl 1971 and 1998, 
Schedler 2002, Norris 2015, O’Donnell 2010). Indeed, empirical research has identified higher 
voter turnout to be associated with greater responsiveness to ordinary citizens in developing 
countries (Besley and Burgess 2002), while others find non-electoral forms of participation to 
make local governments more responsive (Cleary 2007). Yet the expansion of suffrage to allow 
citizens from lower socio-economic strata to participate in politics also threatens the dominance 
of entrenched, elite interests in countries that are transitioning to democracy (Bueno de Mesquita 
et al. 2003, Lehoucq 2007, Meltzer and Richard 1981, Ziblatt 2009).  
Political elites in power therefore have incentives to tip turnout in their favor, either by 
adopting turnout-enhancing or turnout-reducing strategies that subvert the effectiveness of 
citizen participation and which skew how representative it is of the socio-economic interests of 
the entire population. Although electoral fraud has been mostly studied in the context of 
authoritarian regimes, it persists in democracies in a variety of forms (Gans-Morse et al. 2014, 
Schedler 2002, Schaffer 2007). Ziblatt (2009) defines the overarching concept as “a range of 
illegal and legal actions that violate democratic norms by inflating or deflating vote totals for one 
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candidate or party, including actions such as violence, coercion, ‘influence,’ vote buying, or 
procedural manipulations (4).”  
Research on this subject in democratic contexts has gained traction recently, and seminal 
works have explored varieties of tactics that undermine the integrity of elections in clientelistic 
democracies, or systems in which party machines target contingent benefits to citizens (e.g., 
money, gifts, jobs, favors) in exchange for their political support. These studies tend to focus on 
party strategies that increase turnout, such as vote-buying, in which parties reward opposition or 
swing voters for switching their choices (Stokes 2005), or turnout-buying, in which parties 
reward supporters for showing up to the polls (Nichter 2008) and campaign rallies (Szwarcberg 
2012). Other studies provide evidence that turnout is affected by electoral fraud and increases in 
subnational units tightly monitored by ruling parties in which the opposition is weak (Lehoucq 
2007, Klasnja and Pop-Eleches 2016, Larreguy et al. 2016). Fewer works discuss the ways in 
which electoral manipulation may reduce turnout. Cox and Kousser (1981) brought attention to 
abstention-buying in the United States during the late 19th and early 20th centuries in which 
parties paid non-supporters to stay home from the polls. Heckelman (1998) adapts this line of 
inquiry to contemporary U.S. elections and shows that abstention-buying occurs in moderate to 
strong opposition areas with low turnout. Simpser (2012) finds that electoral manipulation by the 
PRI in Mexico decreased turnout but was difficult to detect since the government inflated official 
turnout statistics as part of its strategy of electoral manipulation. He finds that manipulation 
induces greater support for the party, coopts opposition parties, and induces the compliance of 
party affiliates such as brokers (Simpser 2013). 
  Besides active electoral manipulation, political parties can also indirectly lower electoral 
participation by performing poorly. Over time, an individual’s accumulated experience with 
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political corruption and her perceptions of the integrity of elections affect the degree of trust she 
has in elections as a disciplinary mechanism to make politicians accountable (Norris 2014). 
Empirically, Carreras and Irepoglu (2013) find that while vote-buying increases turnout in Latin 
America, low citizen trust in the fairness of elections reduces voter participation. Similarly, Birch 
(2010) finds that perceptions of elections being unfair lower turnout in established as well as 
emerging democracies. Other scholarship finds that exposing citizens to information on local-
level corruption reduces turnout for both incumbent and opposition candidates in Mexico (Chong 
et al. 2014). In Eastern Europe in particular, Ceka (2012) finds that electoral competition lowers 
trust in parties and political participation for citizens with weak partisan attachments by exposing 
citizens to corruption scandals in which incumbents and opposition politicians are implicated.  
My approach contributes to our understanding about how the electoral strategies of strong 
and weak parties affect political participation and democratic representation at subnational 
levels. I explain why lower citizen participation helps strong parties to concentrate power over 
subnational units in electoral democracies where parties are primarily non-programmatic. Aware 
that lower participation helps their electoral chances, strong parties may choose competitive 
strategies that directly or indirectly influence turnout. The literature is still unclear on the ways in 
which electoral competition affects the choices of parties to mix programmatic and clientelistic 
strategies and the aggregate effects on citizen participation. However my work contributes to our 
understanding by empirically demonstrating that strong, patronage political parties may benefit 
when electoral participation is low and likely to be unrepresentative. Furthermore, my theoretical 
framework accounts for two possible, complementary explanations that direct manipulation and 
low democratic quality can be effective strategies to make turnout unrepresentative. 
61 
 
2.3. How Partisan Accountability affects Elections 
My theoretical framework explains how the strategies of strong parties, pursuant to their 
goal of establishing political control over subnational units, may reduce citizen participation in 
elections. Following my theory of partisan accountability, the resources of strong parties provide 
them with capacities to undermine the performance of local democratic institutions. Electoral 
and organizational resources fuel intra-party patronage networks in which central party elites, 
acting as patrons, distribute rewards and punishments to lower-level party members in exchange 
for loyalty to party interests over constituent interests.  
In regard to local elections, partisan accountability helps central party officials to 
coordinate their strategies with local party branches dispersed across the country. Moreover, an 
abundance of electoral resources means that strong parties control greater seat shares in national 
legislatures, municipal councils, and mayorships. These parties thus have extensive experience 
with electoral campaigns at all levels of government. Party organizational resources also 
complement electoral resources by connecting central party officials with local party 
infrastructure. Branch offices provide the center with valuable information about local politics in 
the periphery, while local party affiliates help the center to target, monitor, and mobilize voters 
during campaigns and on election day. Partisan accountability therefore functions as a 
coordination mechanism between central party officials and local party affiliates, turning 
capacities into electoral strategies. 
While electoral and organizational resources provide strong parties with capacities to 
undermine local democratic institutions, the rules governing these institutions can create 
incentives to do so. Specifically, if breaking formal rules imposes few costs (e.g., rule-breakers 
are unlikely to get caught or getting caught has few practical consequences), then politicians are 
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unlikely to abide by formal rules and instead prefer to manipulate them to their advantage. For 
example, in the case of recall referenda in BiH, there are no legal consequences for politicians 
who initiate recalls, even if citizens fail to remove mayors in the referendum stage. Furthermore, 
the financial costs of organizing referenda and early mayoral elections fall on the municipality 
rather than on political parties. Such permissive rules may provide incentives for strong, 
resource-rich parties to initiate recalls more often, even if success is uncertain a priori. Even if 
initiations are not ultimately successful and the mayor is not removed from office, the stakes for 
the initiating party is low, and initiators may view the disruption of local governance under a 
mayor whom they want to remove as a positive outcome if it decreases the mayor’s popular 
support. 
The next two premises connect the above discussion on capacities and incentives of 
strong parties to undermine the performance of local democratic institutions, such as elections, 
with the effects that political party strategies have on citizen participation. In democratic 
systems, elections are supposed to function as an accountability mechanism for citizens choose 
their political leaders, and universal suffrage is a key principle of democratic representation. 
Reductions in voter turnout thus have the effect of limiting citizen voice and the articulation of 
their preferences, particularly if turnout is not representative of the population. 
However, low and non-representative turnout may help strong, clientelistic parties win 
elections. Prominent works have noted that clientelistic linkage requires extensive organizational 
infrastructure to target and monitor, plus the finances and employment opportunities to reward 
supporters with tangible commodities (Stokes 2005, Kitschelt and Kselman 2012). Indeed, my 
theory of partisan accountability, which is primarily concerned with the intra-party arena, 
predicts strong parties to build patronage machines that are also effective in targeting benefits 
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and monitoring supporters who are outside of the party’s formal structures. Resource-poor 
parties, by contrast do not have the capacities to develop their patronage networks to the same 
degree. For mayors from weak parties, greater responsiveness to ordinary citizen interests 
(providing public goods and promoting economic development) is therefore instrumental for re-
election chances.  
One of the implications of this premise is that strong parties prefer voter turnout to be 
limited to their loyal clientele, whereas weak parties prefer turnout to include diverse groups of 
voters whose vote choices are based on policy platforms, programmatic outputs, or charismatic 
appeal rather than clientelistic benefits. The preference of strong parties to exclude voters who 
are outside of their loyal clientele may then translate into strategies that directly or indirectly 
suppress turnout. Directly, electoral manipulation may reduce the effectiveness of participation 
by excluding, intimidating, or buying the votes of non-supporters of the party. Indirectly, if 
citizens perceive a recall against a mayor to be illegitimate, they may be less inclined to 
participate in the local referendum because they have low confidence in the municipality’s 
capacity or integrity to administer the referendum fairly. This theoretical framework leads to the 
following hypotheses in regard to subnational elections: 
H1: The electoral strategies of strong parties reduce citizen participation in elections.  
H2: Strong parties are more successful than weak parties in establishing partisan control over 
subnational governments. 
2.4. Local Elections and Recall Referenda in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
This section builds on the overview of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political institutions, 
party system, and electoral rules that was presented in Chapter 1. I present a background on 
political participation in elections and political trust to justify my case selection of recall 
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referenda initiated against mayors. Figure 1 presents voter turnout in the Federation of BiH and 
RS by the type of election. General elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina occur every four years 
and include all levels of government above the municipal level, including cantonal parliaments 
(only in FBiH), entity parliaments, and BiH’s three-member presidency. Local elections also 
occur every four years in which citizens vote for mayors and municipal counselors, but since 
2002 they have been staggered two years apart from general elections.  2002 is also the year that 
marks the point at which elections began to be held at equivalent intervals, which relates to 
improvements in Bosnia’s security and political stability after the adoption of the Dayton 
Accords in December 1995.  
 
Figure 6: Voter Turnout in BiH 
Unlike most countries in which fewer people tend to vote in local elections relative to 
general elections, Figure 6 illustrates that in BiH, there is no substantial difference in turnout. To 
the contrary, in the RS, average turnout in local elections is 57% and has outpaced turnout in 
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general elections since 2008.25 In FBiH, average turnout in local elections is 59% and has kept 
pace with general elections, except for a dip in 2004.26 Equal levels of participation in both types 
of elections help to control for alternative explanations that could confound my findings. 
Moreover, my theoretical expectation is that strong parties prefer electoral strategies that are 
turnout-reducing. However, attributing low-levels of turnout in recall referenda to electoral 
manipulation or low legitimacy of the recall would be misleading unless one considers other 
contextual factors that could also explain lower turnout. Figure 6 then confirms that there are no 
deep structural or institutional features that would lead us to expect low turnout in local 
referenda.  
Why do Bosnians participate equally in general and local elections, which stands in 
contrast to most established democracies? The answer to this question may at least be partially 
explained by differential patterns of political trust. In general, citizens from post-communist 
Europe as a region are known to exhibit some of the lowest levels of political trust and 
participation (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2013, Rose 2009), so it is not surprising to find that 
turnout has dropped in BiH since the first post-war elections were held in 1996. Yet to 
understand why turnout has been relatively equal for local and general elections, we need to 
explore trust for different types of political agents at multiple levels of government. 
                                                 
25Note that turnout data for the RS is not available before 2000 for general elections, and not before 2004 for local 
elections. Data comes from the Central Election Commission of BiH.  
26The drop in turnout occurred in the first local election in which citizens voted directly for mayors, and has been 
attributed to incompetence and lack of funding to update voter registration lists, rather than active attempts to 
manipulate elections (Sandvik 2004). 
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Figure 7: Citizen Trust in Government Institutions and Organizations in BiH 
 
Figure 7 presents an overview of political trust in Bosnia and Herzegovina, based on 
survey responses to the question: “For each of the following organizations, how much trust do 
you have in it?” The y-axis is the percentage of a random sample of citizens who expressed trust 
for each institution or organization.27 It was calculated by combining the first two response 
categories (“a lot” and “enough”) as opposed to the other two possible choices (“don’t trust” and 
“don’t trust at all”). The figure shows that as far as political actors and institutions are concerned, 
Bosnians express greater levels of trust for their local governments. Going in ascending order, 
only 14% of the population trusts political parties, while trust in state, cantonal, and entity 
parliaments are all below 24%. On the other hand, citizens trust their local governments at higher 
                                                 
27Survey data is from Analitika (2013) “Fakti: Rezultati ankete [Fact Sheet: Survey Results]”, http://analitika.ba/. 
Random sample of citizens, N=1000, except for Cantonal Parliament (only exists in FBiH) where N=585. 
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rates, 31% for elected politicians such as mayors and counselors, and 38% for local 
administration (e.g., local bureaucratic agencies, advisors, and municipal staff). As points of 
references, I include trust in the EU Commission, which is closest to trust in local political 
actors, and trust in the police, which has earned the trust of 57% of Bosnian citizens, the highest 
of all public institutions included in the survey.  
Higher trust in local versus higher levels of governments may explain why turnout in 
local elections has kept pace with general elections over time. Theories of political trust would 
hold that Bosnians participate equally in local elections because they perceive their votes to 
matter and are more engaged at this level of government than with MPs in distant cantonal and 
entity legislatures (e.g. Norris 2014, Pateman 1970). Empirically, the trends for political trust and 
participation in BiH are also in line with recent work on Eastern Europe. Of particular relevance, 
Ceka (2012) finds that corruption exposure acts as a mechanism that lowers political trust and 
voter turnout amongst citizens with weak or no party attachments, but information on corruption 
has no significant effect on citizens who have already formed strong party attachments. 
We can now apply this information to the Bosnian context. As in many other electoral 
democracies, partisan attachments in BiH are not based on programmatic policies but rather on 
patronage benefits (Jansen, Brković, and Čelebčić 2017, Chapters 7-8). In BiH, a country known 
for having one of the most oversized and cumbersome administrative structures in the world,28 
the most widespread currency of patronage is public sector jobs.29 Voters who turn out regularly 
are therefore likely to be the beneficiaries of these coveted jobs which they owe to a political 
                                                 
28For example, BiH has 14 Ministries of Education: State level (one ministry), Entity level (two ministries), 
Cantonal level (10 ministries), and Brčko District (one ministry). 
29BiH spent approximately 12% of GDP on public sector wages in 2013, whereas Macedonia and Albania spent 5% 
in the same year (IMF 2015). 
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party in government. Therefore, low turnout is likely to benefit strong parties because it would 
be non-representative, favoring party loyalists rather than non-committed voters who care about 
programmatic policies. 
Higher trust in local governments relative to trust in political parties is also likely to 
threaten the interests of strong parties. If citizens are not favorably oriented towards mainstream 
political parties (as Figure 7 shows that only 14% are), they may prefer to vote on the reputation 
of an individual candidate rather than on the party’s reputation. First-past-the-post mayoral 
elections and open-list proportional representation for municipal counselors increase this 
tendency. Yet the effects of political trust and electoral rules also intensify the dilemma of 
partisan accountability, since mayors and municipal counselors must maintain loyalty to their 
parties to be nominated as candidates. Chapter 1 has explained how this dilemma plays out in 
recall initiations by showing how partisan accountability relates to intra-party and inter-party 
conflicts and undermines local democracy. Recall referenda, then, appear to be an arena in which 
strong parties would benefit from low turnout in order to exclude non-partisan supporters.  
 
2.5. Data and Empirical Strategy 
Which factors explain when recall initiations led to the removal of mayors and what 
effects to they have on local democracy? When mayors were removed, did the party which led 
the initiation see its preferred candidate win early mayoral elections? To answer these questions, 
I incorporate quantitative and qualitative data for all initiated recalls from 2005 through 2015, 
and I include the dataset is in Appendix 3. The goal of my empirical strategy is to understand 
how partisan and other political factors contribute to recall success and whether they are 
supportive of democratic principles and procedures.  
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Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the success or failure of referenda to remove mayors. Since 
there are 10 successful cases out of a total sample of 26, I construct a dummy variable for the 
outcome and score cases in which a referendum passed and the mayor was removed as one, with 
unsuccessful cases as zero. For each successful case, I include the party affiliation of the 
successor to the incumbent mayor. This data was collected from the archives of the Central 
Election Commission of BiH. 
Independent Variables 
The predictor variables include partisan and other political features that I expect to 
increase the likelihood of referendum success. The partisan factors cover organizational and 
electoral strength of the mayor’s party, initiating party, and the largest party in the municipal 
council.30 Organizational strength, measured in the same way as in Chapter 1, consists of party 
finance as well as the quantity and territorial dispersion of local branch offices. Electoral strength 
is measured in two different ways: The first measure is whether each of the three parties (i.e., 
mayor, initiating, and largest) were part of the governing coalition at the entity level at the time 
of the recall, and is therefore similar to the operationalization from Chapter 1. The second 
indicator of electoral strength is the seat share of these parties in the municipal council, measured 
as a percentage of total seats.31 Thus my measures for electoral strength capture partisan 
representation at both national and local levels.  
                                                 
30Sometimes two or all of these parties coincide, but the patterns vary across cases. 
31I also create a dummy variable to indicate whether the mayor’s party was the largest in the council. 
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I also include a series of predictor variables that specifically relate to incumbent mayors. 
These include the number of terms that the mayor had served (inclusive of the term during the 
recall), whether he ever switched parties, and a measure of party loyalty on a four-point scale 
that indicates whether the incumbent mayor was punished or rewarded by his party before the 
subsequent local election. Punishments involve a deliberate action by the party to hurt a mayor’s 
political career. Examples include a demotion within the party, defamation, and attempting to 
remove the mayor from office. A reward, on the other hand, occurs if the mayor was promoted to 
a position at a higher level of government. The variable is structured on a four point scale with a 
score of 1 (4) indicating that a mayor was punished (rewarded) by his party.32  
The political predictors relating to electoral manipulation cover municipal election data 
from the mayoral election preceding the recall, recall referendum, and early election. To measure 
electoral participation, I include voter turnout rates and a variable that captures the difference in 
voter turnout between the previous mayoral election and the referendum. Voter turnout is 
calculated by dividing the number of votes cast by the total number of registered voters. Because 
turnout figures for individual municipalities may be affected by contextual features that are not 
included in the dataset, the difference in turnout captures referendum turnout relative to the 
previous election, which is the most comparable unit of analysis. It is likely that parties invest 
greater effort into manipulating recall referenda, since they have already gone through the 
initiation procedure and are not distracted by other electoral campaigns. Therefore, if politicians 
                                                 
32A score of 1 indicates punishment and is achieved if a party does not re-nominate an incumbent mayor and it takes 
an action that intentionally hurts the mayor’s political career. A score of 2 indicates that a mayor was not re-
nominated by the party but there is no evidence that it was unamicable. To capture the status-quo, a score of 3 
indicates that the mayor was re-nominated by his party (without regard to the outcome of the election). A score of 4 
indicates a reward, and occurs if a mayor was promoted to a position at a higher level of government. This data was 
hand coded based on local election data, media reports from multiple sources that were cross-checked, and 
interviews with four mayors who were punished by their parties. 
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manipulate recall referenda more than regular local elections, we are most likely to observe it 
through the relative difference in turnout. Next I include a proxy for electoral manipulation by 
creating a dummy variable in which a score of 1 indicates that the recall referendum followed 
was in accordance with law, and a zero in cases where the Central Election Commission annulled 
the results because the referendum or early election violated legal procedures.  
Since scholarship has found competitiveness of elections to affect turnout, I include vote 
shares and margins of victory for the incumbent mayor (and new mayor in the ten successful 
cases in which early elections were held). Other covariates include a dummy variable to indicate 
the regional entity, and a factor variable to indicate the reason for recall initiation (following the 
typology of conflict-type presented in Chapter 1: inter-party conflict, intra-party conflict, local 
conflict, poor governance). The measures and data sources for party strength have been 
discussed extensively in Chapter 1. Electoral data, including recall referenda and early elections, 
were collected from the Central Election Commission of BiH. Qualitative data for the five recalls 
that were deemed to be illegal comes from media reports and interviews. The full dataset is 
included in Appendix 3. 
Method 
I employ a classification tree to identify the political factors that optimally predict when 
mayors are removed from office. Classification trees are a nonparametric, machine-based 
learning method that make predictions about a discrete or qualitative outcome by dividing the 
predictor space into non-overlapping regions. Recursive binary splitting is used to grow the 
branches of the tree, in which the model predicts the most commonly occurring class of the 
observations in a given region to which the qualitative response variable belongs. The criteria for 
splitting is to minimize classification error rate, or the fraction of observations that do not belong 
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to the most commonly occurring class in each region. The advantage of this method is that it can 
accommodate small samples and several discrete factor levels for a given variable, obviating the 
need to make dummies out of qualitative variables. Trees are also useful when relationships are 
non-linear, and they provide easy visualization and interpretability.  
This method works well for my small sample of data, in which the outcome of interest 
occurred in 10 of 26 cases. In addition, while I have expectations that the predictor variables 
should be associated with recall success, it is likely that different combinations of predictors may 
interact in different ways, making the relationship non-linear. Tree-based methods are adept at 
handling various combinations and interactions that minimize classification error. One downside, 
however, is that classification trees are often non-robust to small changes in the data (James et al. 
2013, Loh 2011, Ripley 2016). As a robustness check, I perform k-fold cross validation. Since 
collinearity of the independent variables affects the variables that the method chooses as 
predictors, I included one political configuration variable and one electoral variable at a time to 
be sure this did not influence the results. 
I employ the classification tree to determine the combination of partisan and political 
factors that make recalls successful. Support for my expectation would be to find recall success 
to be dependent on the degradation of formal electoral processes and democratic principles. 
Finally, in the ten cases in which recalls were successful, I identify the successor’s party from 
early election results and compare it to the data from the initiation stage. Evidence that strong 
parties become successors to incumbent mayors against whom they initiated recalls would 
support the claim that strong parties subvert this institution of local direct democracy as a means 
to extend political and economic control over municipal governments.  
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2.6. Results 
Recall Success and Implications for Local Democracy 
The results of the classification tree show the factors that optimally predict when recalls 
are successful. Following standard practice, I randomly divided 70% of the data into a training 
set to fit the model and 30% into a test set to predict outcomes of new observations. Because the 
dataset is small,33 I randomized the division of training and test data multiple times to see 
whether the model chose the same predictors, and each time I used k-fold cross-validation on the 
training set with k=5 to prune the tree. I then used the pruned model to check the predictive 
capacity of the test set observations before selecting the best-fitting model (i.e. lowest 
classification error rate). Figure 8 shows the results using the entire dataset, in which the total 
misclassification rate can be seen as being analogous to an R-squared value in OLS regression, 
rather than an indication of predictive value.  
Corresponding to the first node in Figure 8, the model finds that recall success is 
conditional on fewer veto players in the municipal council and lower voter turnout relative to the 
previous local election. Specifically, mayors are not removed when the largest party in the 
council controls less than 29% of total seats, which is close to the one-third threshold required 
for counselors to initiate a recall. Lower party fragmentation may make it easier for counselors to 
coordinate their political strategies, but it is not indicative of undermining democratic 
representation on its own.  
                                                 
33There were a total of 24 observations after two cases were dropped because turnout data was not available. 
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Figure 8: Predictors of Recall Success 
 
The second node of the tree, on the other hand, illustrates that once the 29% threshold is 
met, mayors are successfully recalled if turnout in the referendum is at least 19 percentage points 
lower than turnout in the previous mayoral election. The turnout-reducing effect of successful 
recalls has the biggest implication for local democracy: Mayors are more likely to be deposed 
when fewer residents vote relative to the previous mayoral election, which implies that recall 
success undermines citizen representation. This finding on voter turnout is supported by looking 
at the raw data more closely: The average difference in turnout for successful recalls was 27 
percentage points (meaning that voter turnout in referenda was on average 27 percentage points 
lower than in the previous election), whereas for unsuccessful cases turnout was only 9 
percentage points lower than in the previous mayoral election. According to Welch’s T-test, the 
difference in means between these two subsamples is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. In 
the Appendix, I provide voter turnout rates to show that turnout in the previous election was not 
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abnormally high (mean is 59%, which is similar to mean turnout for all local elections in RS 
(57%) and FBiH (59%). 
Overall, the rate of misclassification is 12.5%, or 3 out of 24 cases in which the tree 
failed to predict that the mayor was successfully removed (cases P, R, and S). R is the intra-party 
recall that occurred in Banovići, a stronghold of the mayor’s party as it controlled 74% of the 
seats in the municipal council. The mayor’s party, which also initiated the recall, is the strongest 
party in FBiH, with the highest possible scores for organizational and electoral resources. 
Turnout was 15.6 percentage points lower in the referendum than in the previous election, which 
is slightly below the threshold predicted by the classification tree. Qualitative evidence from 
interviews and media reports revealed that electoral manipulation indeed occurred in the form of 
vote-buying, with party officials coercing and intimidating residents who supported the mayor to 
vote against him in the referendum. Since vote-buying is associated with higher turnout, this may 
account for the relative change in turnout to be low enough to meet the threshold in the 
classification tree.  
P was an inter-party recall in which the mayor’s party and initiating party controlled the 
same percentage of seats in the municipal council. Turnout in the referendum was only 5 
percentage points lower than in previous election, which may be due to simultaneous efforts of 
both parties to mobilize their supporters. This type of electoral manipulation would correspond to 
the “dueling machine” scenario envisioned by Stokes (2005), Nichter (2008) and further 
ruminated upon by Gans-Morse et al. (2014), but these authors predict such a scenario to be rare 
and do not analyze it empirically. R was initiated due to poor governance and occurred in a tiny 
municipality with fewer than 200 residents. The mayor’s party had the most seats in the 
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municipal council and the turnout difference was 17%, which is slightly lower than the threshold 
found by the classification tree.  
The classification tree did not include the legality variable—which is a direct measure of 
electoral manipulation—as a predictor of recall success. Yet qualitative data reveals four out of 
six of the cases that were declared illegal by the Central Election Commission34 reduced citizen 
participation. In cases L and V, absentee ballots were sent out late and could have altered the 
results, since the referendum passed by less than 350 votes in both cases, lower than the number 
of registered absentee voters. In case H, the Central Election Commission found that the 
municipality prevented over one-thousand refugees from accessing absentee ballots while the 
referendum to recall the mayor passed by less than two hundred votes. In case E, turnout in the 
referendum was found to be too low to recall the mayor because less than half of all registered 
voters voted in favor of the recall. Of these illegal cases, H, L, and V were initiated by strong 
parties which controlled the most seats (or were tied for the most seats) in the municipal council.  
Taking the quantitative and qualitative analysis together as a whole, the results support 
the notion that recall success is predicted by reductions in citizen participation: Mayors are more 
likely to be removed when fewer citizens vote in referenda. Furthermore, in four cases the mayor 
would have been removed save for intervention by the CEC because vulnerable groups of 
registered voters were either prevented from participating or were disincentivized from voting. 
This is quite a subversion of democratic representation, considering that formally, recalls were 
set up as an institution of local direct democracy—embodied by the referendum procedure—for 
                                                 
34The two cases where legal discrepancies did not reduce turnout were W and X, in which the municipality lacked 
funds for early elections (W) or did not meet the deadline for early elections (X), so the mayor was not removed. 
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citizens to sanction poor-performing mayors. The evidence instead suggests that recalls stifle 
turnout and this benefits strong parties to remove mayors for political reasons. 
Strong Parties and Recall Success 
Are strong parties more successful at removing mayors? While the classification tree did 
not find party resources to predict success, stratifying the rate of referendum success by party 
strength and conflict-type provides us with some clues. At first glance it would appear that strong 
parties are more successful, since they initiated seven of the ten successful cases, equivalent to a 
success rate of 70%. On the other hand, municipal counselors from weak parties were successful 
in cases A and I (in which they initiated recalls against mayors from other weak parties). Case S, 
which had been initiated by multiple parties, was successful and supportive of local democracy. 
However, if we stratify success rates by party strength—meaning that the success rate for strong 
parties is conditional on the number of times these parties initiated recalls—then the rate drops to 
seven out of 19 initiations, or 37%. The success rate for weak parties jumps to 50%, since they 
were successful in two of four initiations. This suggests that strong parties achieve greater 
overall success because they initiate recalls more often.  
Further evidence that recall success is conditional on the frequency of initiation can be 
observed by the distribution of success rates across conflict types. For example, success rates for 
the cases of inter-party conflict are relatively even for both types of parties: Strong parties were 
successful 36% of the time (in 5 out of 14 cases they initiated), whereas weak parties were 
successful 40% of the time (2 out of 5 cases). What are the theoretical implications that strong 
parties enjoy greater overall success in removing mayors simply because they attempt it more 
often? This finding suggests that institutional rules—specifically the lack of legal consequences 
for recall failure—provide pernicious incentives for strong parties. Since strong parties have 
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greater organizational and electoral capacities than weak parties to subvert democratic 
institutions, it pays for strong parties to initiate recalls more frequently when it might lead the 
party to gain control of the mayorship. This implication is bolstered by data from early elections. 
Namely, in every successful case, parties that led recall initiations went on to win early elections 
and cement their control over the mayorship.  
2.7. Discussion 
The empirical analysis of recall referenda and early elections supports the claim that in 
the vast majority of cases, politicians manipulate recalls into a means to extend political control 
rather than reinforcing local democratic accountability. The analysis shows that strong, resource-
rich parties are successful in extending control over municipal governments because they 
frequently initiate recalls. Even though recall referenda often fail, organizational and electoral 
resources give strong parties pernicious capacities, while permissive institutional rules provide 
them with incentives to sanction mayors who threaten party interests.  
Although less than half of the attempts were successful in ousting incumbent mayors, 
initiations incur costs to municipal governments by distracting local politicians from their daily 
work and spending budgetary resources on referenda. Since there are no legal consequences for 
municipal counselors for recall failure, it is often difficult for mayors to work productively with 
the same municipal counselors who attempted to depose him. This type of unfavorable work 
environment could also be beneficial to the initiating party, since the mayor’s policy 
performance is likely to suffer, which would reduce his popularity with citizens, and hence 
increase the electoral chances of the party that tried to remove him. 
More broadly, this chapter has shed light on the understudied topic of the consequences 
of low political participation in emerging democracies. While most of the literature on electoral 
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manipulation focuses on competitive strategies that enhance turnout such as vote-buying, my 
work demonstrates that low political participation can be also be winning strategy for strong, 
clientelistic parties. Although this finding is conditional on the type of clientelistic benefits being 
distributed and low political trust, my work empirically demonstrates that elections can reduce 
political participation in ways that undermine their function as an accountability mechanism. 
Furthermore, it provides evidence that both the active and passive strategies of strong parties to 
tip elections in their favor not only reduces electoral participation only in the short-term, but it 
may also stifle political trust and participation over time if citizens do not perceive elections to 
be legitimate. In countries like Bosnia where citizens trust municipal governments to a greater 
degree than political parties and politicians at higher levels, strong parties use partisan 
accountability to try to break the link between programmatic-oriented mayors and their 
constituents.  
In the following chapter, I present four case studies in which parties punished mayors for 
disloyalty, and in three cases, I show different methods they used to directly manipulate 
elections. These cases suggest that electoral manipulation takes different forms depending on the 
political context, making direct manipulation difficult to trace systematically. Despite the 
difficulties in uncovering these practices, the competitive strategies that strong parties use in 
elections are sure to have long-lasting damage on effective citizen participation and the principle 
of democratic representation, particularly in decentralized contexts. 
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3. VARIETIES OF PUNISHMENTS: PARTISAN ACCOUNTABILITY IN PRACTICE 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 The previous chapter analyzed the extent to which political parties are successful in 
removing mayors through recalls and the factors which predict recall success. The results from a 
tree-based machine-learning method showed that low voter turnout optimally predicts recall 
success, meaning that mayors are most likely to be removed when fewer residents vote in recall 
referenda. This evidence suggests that recall success undermines citizen participation in elections 
and therefore implies that this institution of local direct democracy is not representative of citizen 
interests. Furthermore, it showed that strong parties are more successful than weak parties 
because they initiate recalls more frequently. While their resources provide capacities to 
undermine institutional performance, the lenient rules governing recall procedures create 
incentives for strong parties to initiate recalls even when success is uncertain.  
 In this chapter, I analyze within-case evidence and I use subnational comparative case 
studies to illustrate my causal theory of partisan accountability. I analyze four cases in which 
mayors were punished by their parties to trace how strong, resource-rich parties employ partisan 
accountability to discipline disloyal mayors and thereby concentrate political power over 
subnational units. My analysis also shows that weak parties are less effective in punishing 
disloyal mayors, and it concludes with the effects that punishments have on local democracy. In 
sum, within-case evidence explains how the different parts of the causal mechanism, partisan 
accountability, interlock to produce the outcome, successful punishment of mayors. Controlled, 
cross-case comparisons complement the findings from the individual cases by increasing 
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external validity, narrowing down necessary and sufficiency of causes, and controlling for other 
potential explanatory factors (e.g. Beach and Pederson 2016; Collier, Brady and Seawright 2010; 
Lijphart 1971; Sartori 1991). 
 Traditional case study approaches such as Mill’s method of agreement or difference set 
out to establish causal homogeneity of observations to make inferences on small, bounded 
populations. Whereas Mill’s method of agreement selects cases that exhibit the outcome and has 
been criticized for selecting on the dependent variable (Geddes 2003; King, Keohane, and Verba 
1994), Mill’s method of difference compares cases that differ on the outcome variable (Mill 
1843, Chapter 7). Other scholars have advocated for controlled comparative case studies that do 
not select on the outcome variable, such as the most –similar-systems or most-different-systems 
design (Przeworski and Teune 1970 and Lijphart 1975). In the most similar system design, cases 
are similar on all covariates except the treatment variable, which varies across cases to see if 
treatment causes outcome. However these scholars have also noted that it is often difficult to 
isolate treatment effects with this approach, as there is always some level of heterogeneity 
between cases. Furthermore, the design limits theory building because cases are only selected 
based on causal conditions (Beach and Pederson 2016). 
My research strategy builds on the causal case study method advocated by Beach and 
Pederson (2016). Specifically, I use a hybrid most-similar-system design in which I select cases 
that vary on outcomes and treatment but are as similar as possible on covariates (Beach and 
Pederson 2016, Berg-Schlosser 2012). Within-case evidence shows how causal factors interact 
and link to the outcome in predictable ways, while cross-case evidence helps to establish the 
bounds of the causal theory. In addition, comparing subnational units within the same country 
improves the validity of inferences since it automatically controls for many contextual factors at 
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the country level. The subnational comparative method also increases the precision and accuracy 
of evidence that would be far more difficult to do across countries and thereby increases the 
validity of inferences (Snyder 2001). 
My design also employs the method of paired comparisons, which has been applied to 
both qualitative and quantitative work. My approach follows the logic of the pairwise 
randomized experiment in which pairs have similar values on all explanatory factors but vary on 
assignment to treatment or control (Imbens and Rubin 2015, Chapter 10). This method has also 
been advocated by qualitative scholars, particularly Tarrow (2010), as a means of 
complementing the most-similar systems-design.  I complement my hybrid most-similar-on-
causes, most-different-on-outcomes design, by pairing two sets of cases that are similar on 
covariates but vary on treatment and outcome, which I explain in detail below. 
3.2. Case Selection and Operationalization of Concepts  
The population of cases from which I sample are mayors who were punished by their 
political parties while in office. Again, I define a punishment to be a deliberate action by a party 
to hurt a mayor’s political career, such as demotion within the party, or an attempt to remove a 
mayor from office. As presented by Tables 1 and 2 in the introduction, I identified fifteen cases 
in which mayors were punished over four election cycles between 2004 and 2016. Since there 
are only 15 cases, it is safe to say that punishments are not typical of mayoral tenures in BiH, but 
they are crucial cases in which to test my theory of partisan accountability. In addition, my 
criteria is stringent since I relied on media reports to identify whether the party intended to hurt a 
mayor’s career rather than simply not re-nominating him for candidacy. The fact that my coding 
decisions are based on multiple qualitative sources that are in agreement about the events and do 
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not contradict one another35 inspires confidence that my coding is accurate: Each of these 15 
mayors were indeed punished for being disloyal to party interests. 
The criteria for my case selection is to choose two cases from the RS and two from FBiH 
that vary on assignment to treatment and outcome, but otherwise have similar covariates. In the 
RS, there is only one case, Foča, which I identified as a mayor from a weak party who was 
punished.36 At the time that the mayor took office, Foča had very unfavorable economic 
conditions which makes it difficult to match on this covariate with other RS municipalities. 
However, it is an interesting, high-profile case in which information was more available and 
accessible than all other RS cases. I select also select Laktaši, in which two mayors from the 
same strong party were punished only two years apart.37 Since the events are unlikely to be 
independent from each other, I treat these two punishments as one case. For the FBiH, I select 
Banovići and Goražde, two cases which meet my causal identification strategy and for which the 
punished mayors agreed to be interviewed. 
I present the cases in the table below, with corresponding information for each variable. 
The outcome of interest is successful punishment: the removal of a mayor from office. The 
treatment variable is the strength of the mayor’s party, since my theoretical framework from 
Chapter 1 predicts strong parties to discipline disloyal, lower level politicians more effectively. 
Other covariates that I expect to influence the outcome are the regional entity (since the RS and 
FBiH have different levels of decentralization and different party systems, as explained in 
                                                 
35Qualitative data sources are listed in Appendix 2. 
36In general, there are fewer mayors from weak parties in the RS. Foča is also a hybrid case because the recall was 
initiated by SNSD, which then caused the mayor’s party (SP) to punish him three years later when they revoked his 
party membership. It therefore an interesting case in which to understand the within-case, causal logic. 
37I interviewed the Laktasi mayor who was punished in 2014. 
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Chapter 1), the population of the municipality38 (which affects the nature of local politics and 
relationships between municipalities and higher levels of governance) and the economic 
conditions of a municipality, because strong parties should have greater incentives to extend 
control over municipalities with greater economic resources.  
Table 8: Overview of Cases and Causal Variables 
Case Year Strength of 
Mayor’s  
Party 
(Treatment) 
(Control) 
Entity Pop. Economic 
Development 
Potential 
Punishment strategy Outcome 
Banovići 2013 Strong (T) FBiH 23,000 High  
(coal mine) 
Recall,  
Remove from party 
Successful 
Goražde 2015 Weak (C) FBiH 21,000 High  
(industry) 
Remove from party Unsuccessful 
Laktaši 2014 
2016 
Strong (T) RS 35,000 High  
(agriculture) 
Resignation,  
Remove from party 
Successful 
Foča 2007 Weak (C) RS 18,000 Low  
(int’l 
sanctions) 
Recall,  
Remove from party 
Unsuccessful/ 
mixed 
 
The outcome is measured against the party’s punishment strategy. In three cases parties 
tried to remove mayors while in office, whereas the mayor of Goražde was left to finish his term. 
Since he won re-election after the punishment, I code the outcome as unsuccessful. Local 
political competition should also influence the outcome, however, I find it to be endogenous to 
the treatment variable. Namely, the two cases in which mayors come from strong parties were 
party strongholds, whereas the control cases have greater competition at the time the mayor was 
elected, but were previously the bastion of a strong party. This is related to the fact that the 
election of a mayor from a weak party was a major disruption to the political status-quo.  
                                                 
38Municipalities in BiH vary from less than 500 inhabitants to more than 100,000 inhabitants. All four cases are in 
the 3rd quartile between the median and 75 percentile. 
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Qualitative data comes from two separate ninety-minute, semi-structured interviews that I 
conducted with the mayors from Goražde and Foča in the summer of 2014 and again in 2016. 
For Banovići and Laktaši, I conducted ninety-minute, semi-structured interviews with the former 
mayors in the summer of 2016.  In addition, I consulted domestic and international political 
experts in BiH as well as media and investigative journalist reports on the four local conflicts. 
Appendix 2 contains qualitative data sources listed by municipality, interview information, and 
quantitative sources.  
In the next sections, I present the case studies in which within-case information is used to 
analyze the source of the conflict, the type of punishment and strategy leading to the observed 
outcome. The case studies included in this chapter are punishments in which the mayor’s party 
membership was revoked, and in three cases the party attempted to remove the mayor during his 
term. Thus they fall on the moderate to severe end of punishments. These cases were selected 
because they serve as crucial tests in which we would be most likely to observe partisan 
accountability.39 If they do not provide evidence in support of the theory, then my theory would 
no longer be convincing or valid.  
3.3. Banovići 
Banovići is a town in Eastern Bosnia that is best known for its coal mine, a semi-public 
entity which employs approximately 3,000 workers out of a total population of 23,300. The 
economic value of the mine, which has an annual budget of 90 million Euros, has led SDA (the 
strongest party in FBiH) to brand the town into a party stronghold and exploit its valuable natural 
                                                 
39In addition, it is useful to look at Foča in comparison to Gorazde, as they are neighboring towns in different 
entities. The mayors are highly charismatic mavericks from weak parties and have similar styles of governance. 
They were the most transparent mayors I interviewed in the country. 
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resource. This case illustrates how strong parties use partisan accountability to punish dissident 
mayors who are responsive to community needs over partisan interests. In this case, the mayor’s 
party recalled him successfully and intentionally destroyed the mayor’s political career. 
Origins of Conflict 
In 2008, a new SDA mayor was elected by a margin of 36 percentage points over the 
second place candidate. In 2012 this mayor was re-elected by an even larger margin of 51 
percentage points. The mayor had support from the municipal council during both terms since 
SDA commanded 15 of 20 seats in his first term, and 17 seats in the second term. From the 
perspective of the mayor and the local SDA branch, the unified local government was a 
fortuitous situation which made passing decisions and planning public policies easy and 
efficient. What could possibly go wrong? 
The mayor, a professional engineer elected to two terms, is still not certain how the 
conflict began. Looking back, he believes that it started in his second term when he gave signals 
to a prominent economic and political notable that he disagreed with the removal of the president 
of SDA’s municipal branch40 and that he was concerned with the management and financial 
sustainability of the coal mine. The local notable is the former managing director of the mine, a 
member of SDA’s cantonal board and a highly influential figure amongst SDA’s central party 
leadership, and also a convicted felon who was imprisoned for 18 months for committing 
financial crimes. When the mayor sensed that the notable was irked, he offered his resignation as 
a peace offering.  
                                                 
40According to my interview with the mayor, he told the notable that the president of the local branch “was a good 
man.” 
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Punishment Strategy 
Rather than accepting the mayor’s resignation, the notable retaliated by accusing him of 
misdeeds and threatening to inflict violence. The mayor, indignant that his professional 
reputation was being tarnished, decided to remain in office and filed police reports to no avail. 
Witnesses, although the mayor never named them, were handed jobs at the cantonal and 
Federation level to assure their silence. The reaction of the local notable therefore points to the 
conflict being about party loyalty. The disagreement, no matter how benign, signaled that the 
mayor’s well-meaning, professional concerns could threaten Banovići’s position in the party’s 
exploitative patronage network. He then used patronage rewards, public sector jobs at higher 
levels of government, to induce the loyalty of SDA municipal counselors and initiate a recall 
against the mayor.  
Why was the local notable’s strategy succcessful? The mayor had good relations with the 
leading faction in the central SDA headquarters until he was recalled in 2013. However, the local 
notable was well-positioned in the party’s cantonal branch and held the mining company as his 
trump card. He had total control over all mining operations (procurement contracts, employees, 
inspectors, etc.) and could use it to blackmail the central party leadership whenever he wanted to 
provoke a crisis within the party (e.g. withholding economic rents from the party, mobilizing 
workers to strike or co-opting MPs he had nominated as candidates, etc.). SDA central leadership 
could not risk bad relations with the local notable because the mining company was too valuable 
of a resource. 
The electoral campaign leading up to the referendum was unquestionably dirty, yet no 
legal consequences followed. Banovići’s SDA branch, led by the local notable, embarked on an 
aggressive campaign not only to remove the mayor from office, but also to destroy his personal 
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and professional reputation and to physically threaten anyone who associated him or herself with 
the mayor. For example, he went door to door coercing community leaders and the mayor’s own 
family members and members of the local Muslim community (in which the mayor had been 
actively involved) to vote in favor of the recall in the referendum.  
The mayor stated that there were also procedural irregularities in the recall. This included 
a conflict of interest in which two counselors who officially began the initiation were on the 
referendum commission, and an individual in the commission who had been banned from 
politics by the Central Election Commission, and validating 40,000 ballots instead of 20,000 
(population of Banovići is 23,000). To remedy the first two problems, the local notable 
manipulated the municipal logbook. Despite electoral manipulation, the recall passed with 80% 
in favor and the mayor was then easily replaced with another SDA politician whose official 
margin of victory is 88 percentage points. The mayor filed a complaint with the Central Election 
Commission, but stated that they never followed up because one of the presidents had a personal 
relationship with the local notable. 
Outcome 
The punishment strategy was a resounding success: The mayor was removed and became 
persona non grata in Banovići while the local notable has moved up the ranks of SDA: president 
of the municipal branch, president of the cantonal branch from 2015, vice president of the party, 
then part of the presidency of the party, and MP in the Federation. Other evidence about the 
power of this notable is that SDA politicians from Banovići have an oversized presence of 
representatives in cantonal and Federation parliaments in relation to its population. This means 
that these MPs from Banovići were ranked high on SDA’s candidate list in the general elections.  
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The mayor, on the other hand, describes his alienation from the community as house 
arrest. Many of his friends, particularly prominent figures in the academic and religious 
community, as well as some family members, have been threatened by the party to not publically 
acknowledge the mayor. His personal and professional reputation was destroyed to the point that 
even his son and daughter have not been able to find employment after graduating from 
university as an engineer and lawyer, respectively. The mayor sued the mine to try to regain his 
employment and the court battle is now in the cantonal court. A case against the mayor was sent 
to the cantonal prosecutor, accusing the mayor of 64 criminal charges, and it is still pending. 
According to the former mayor, the mine is currently 50 million euros in debt with injuries and 
accidents on the rise, yet they are pushed under the carpet. In addition, a law professor who 
warned the municipal government of these issues was also threatened by the party, while mining 
inspectors do not report negative findings for fear of losing their jobs.  
Epilogue  
The local notable’s strategy to increase his influence within SDA was finally thwarted in 
2018 by SDA’s leadership after several cantonal party officials voiced complaints that his 
nepotism was destroying the cantonal party branch: several SDA members were placed lower on 
candidate lists than the notable’s loyal cadre, or simply not nominated. SDA found itself in a 
major crisis as Tuzla canton, in which Banovići belongs, is a politically important region in 
Eastern Bosnia. The notable recently formed his own party.  
In sum, this case study is paradigmatic of the way in which strong parties use patronage 
resources to subvert recalls into an informal means to punish disloyal mayors who put the 
interests of citizens ahead of their party’s economic and political interests. In this case, the 
conflict was over the mayor’s effort to create a responsible municipal administration and to 
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increase the financially sustainability of the town’s main industry and valuable natural resource. 
Unfortunately the local notable used his economic and political power, which was derived by his 
control over the mining company, to destroy the career of the mayor, deter other members from 
the community from being disloyal to the party’s interests, and to move himself up the SDA 
party hierarchy.  
3.4. Goražde 
In 2008, a new mayor beat the incumbent by a margin of four percentage points. Despite 
the municipality being a traditional SDA stronghold, the mayor has managed to stay in power for 
three terms in which he represented SBiH in his first term, SBB in the second, and ran as an 
independent in his current term.  He has increased his margin of victory in each subsequent 
election. This case is a clear example of an unsuccessful attempt to punish the mayor, a maverick 
politician who has cultivated his own brand of politics by improving local socio-economic 
development and establishing direct linkages with his constituents.  
Origins of Conflict 
Goražde is the most urbanized municipality in the Eastern part of FBiH, and is politically 
important for historical and strategic reasons. During the Bosnian War, Goražde was engulfed in 
a protracted siege because of its geographic isolation at the end of a narrow valley. The town’s 
infrastructure, including the large munitions factory it hosted in Yugoslav times, was decimated, 
but it continued to be a politically important municipality. SDA invested a great deal into its 
Goražde branch because of its symbolic importance as a Bosniak enclave that managed to 
liberate itself during the war and its strategic importance as an urban center in the far Eastern 
part of FBiH.  
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The mayor has come into conflict with three different political parties, and each conflict 
has strengthened his political reputation. Originally a member of SDA, which dominated the 
municipal administration in Goražde, he was fired from his job as high school principal after he 
tried to modernize the local public school but was told by the local SDA leadership not to stand 
out. In 2008, he ran on SBiH’s ticket and beat the incumbent SDA candidate by less than four 
percentage points. Despite a divided government in which SDA controlled the most seats in the 
municipal council, (8 of 25 seats) the municipal government functioned smoothly and 
accomplished a great deal. 
The mayor’s public policies have focused on economic development and improving the 
provision of local public goods. He has established programmatic linkage with citizens, and 
often remarks that his style of governance is to build trust by communicating directly with 
residents, through weekly office hours and the municipality’s website. Practically, the municipal 
government eased business registration procedures to encourage business start-ups and reduce 
unemployment. As a result, the unemployment rate has fallen since 2008 when it was equal to 45 
percent and was ranked 28th in the FBiH. In 2016, unemployment was 31.6 percent, which is the 
second lowest in FBiH. In addition, the mayor applied for grants-funded projects to international 
donors as diverse as USAID, the World Bank, Turkish and Saudi Arabian governments. These 
funds were used to co-finance capital investment projects, such as modernizing local water 
infrastructure, improving the agricultural water supply system, and a public park.  By doing so, 
the mayor effectively bypassed domestic state institutions. This style of direct linkage with 
citizens and the international community irked the political establishment in Goražde because the 
mayor built his political reputation by being responsive to community interests rather than 
depending on the support of political parties and state actors. 
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Punishment Strategy 
At the time of his first election, SBiH should be considered a strong party, as its 
candidate controlled the Bosniak member of the BiH and it had a dense organizational 
infrastructure.41 The mayor was pressured to submit to party interests, which encroached on his 
policy agenda. He then switched to SBB for the 2012 election and won by a comfortable margin 
of 19 percentage points, with SDA’s seat share in the municipal council stable at seven. The 
mayor, presiding over SBB’s cantonal branch, then got into a conflict with the president of SBB 
in 2015 after he proposed forming a coalition with SDA at the cantonal level, despite the fact that 
at the Federation level, SBB was part of the opposition while SDA was a governing party (the 
mayor was also a member of SBB’s cantonal branch). Since SDA controlled the cantonal 
government, the mayor pursued this strategy for pragmatic reasons which were to increase 
financial flows from the canton to Goražde, since financial support from the canton was lacking. 
The president of SBB revoked the mayor’s party membership but let him continue as mayor. 
This calculation is most likely due to the fact that SBB had only two mayors in BiH, whose 
popularity improved the party’s image. Therefore, it is likely that SBB did not try to remove him 
from office (e.g. recall) to avoid alienating the electorate in Goražde and because the party did 
not have enough resources with which to co-opt other counselors. 
Outcome 
The strategies of all three parties was unsuccessful: after leaving each party, the mayor 
won each subsequent mayoral election. The mayor ran as an independent candidate in the 2016 
local elections, and won by 31 percentage points, his largest margin of victory to date. During 
                                                 
41This classification is also based on an interview in 2016 with a politician who was a former political campaign 
strategist for SBiH. 
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the campaign, SDA and SBB formed a pre-electoral coalition and nominated a weak candidate 
for mayor who was only 25 years old and had no prior political experience. This attests to the 
fact that the strongest party in FBiH gave up hopes of winning back Goražde: SDA chose not to 
waste a high quality candidate who would likely lose against the incumbent mayor. This case 
illustrates how mayors from weak parties have incentives to build programmatic linkages with 
citizens as an insurance mechanism to shield them from punishments from parties. By leveraging 
their popularity with citizens, particularly in politically advantageous municipalities such as 
Goražde, mayors from weak parties can not only salvage their political careers, but also improve 
their public reputations even further.   
3.5. Foča 
The conflict in Foča began in 2004 after a candidate from a weak party was elected as 
mayor by a slim margin. The pinnacle of the conflict occurred in 2007 when the mayor was 
recalled by his party’s coalition partner in the RS government, but it continued into the 2016 
local election in which the former mayor lost by less than one-thousand votes. This case explains 
the causal logic of an inter-party conflict between two governing parties (SP and SNSD) with 
different organizational capacities, which eventually spilled over into an intra-party conflict. The 
outcome of the punishment strategy is classified as unsuccessful, but it is actually mixed. The 
party that tried to depose the mayor, SNSD, was not successful in its recall attempt but 
eventually managed to win the mayorship. In addition, while the mayor was unsuccessful in the 
2012 and 2016 local elections, he managed to reinvent his political career by forming a new 
party and currently serves as MP in the RS National Assembly. 
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Origins of Conflict  
In 2004 a new SP mayor shook up the local political establishment after being elected by 
1.8 percentage points and quickly implemented sweeping democratic reforms. The municipal 
council was split with SNSD (leader of the RS government) and SDS (leader of the opposition), 
holding the most seats (six and seven, respectively, out of 31).42  As the mayor began his first 
term, Foča had extremely unfavorable economic conditions. The international community 
overseeing BiH’s post-conflict transition had placed sanctions on the municipality because 
numerous war criminals that had been indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) were known to be living at-large in town.   
Through the mayor’s commitment to the rule of law and building a more ethnically 
tolerant environment (e.g., arresting indicted war criminals, rebuilding housing for Bosniaks to 
encourage refugee returns), sanctions against the town were lifted less than two years after the 
mayor assumed office (OHR 2006). The mayor also attempted to create a more responsible local 
administration by reducing his own salary and the salaries of municipal counselors,43 and with 
the help of American and European donors, he managed several large public projects such as 
rebuilding the town’s cultural center, a recreational park, and encouraging tourism to the 43,000-
acre Sutjeska National Park that lies on its territory.44  
                                                 
42PDP, a weaker opposition party than SDS held 6 seats, while the mayor’s party, SP, held 4. 
43I verified this by analyzing differences in municipal spending on personnel during the mayor’s last year in office 
and after he left office. Municipal budget data was collected from the Center for the representation of citizen 
interests: http://javnefinansije.cpi.ba/.  
44Sutjeska contains section one of the last primeval forests in Europe and is dated to be 20,000 years old. At the foot 
of the park lies an important historical site of memory, a WWII monument commemorating the victory of Tito’s 
Partisans against the Axis powers in the Battle of Sutjeska.   
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A political conflict quickly ensued between the mayor and the president of SNSD, who 
also served as prime minister of the RS entity. During two separate interviews with the mayor, he 
stated that his programmatic policies—providing local public goods, improving the efficiency of 
public administration, engaging with the international community, and integrating ethnic 
minorities—challenged the political status-quo of patronage and ethnic nationalism in the RS. 
Political elites at higher levels of government felt threatened by the positive attention this mayor 
was receiving from both the local and international communities. Here was a maverick mayor 
who built his political reputation by being transparent and responsive to his community’s socio-
economic interests. His programmatic connection with his constituents stood in stark contrast to 
the municipality’s failure until now to come to terms with its dark history, a town which had 
achieved international notoriety for its wartime rape camps where Bosniak women were 
imprisoned during the 1990s (e.g., Human Rights Watch 1998). Instead of evading Foča’s 
wartime legacies of ethnic cleansing as had been the politics until this point in time, the mayor 
facilitated the arrest of indicted war criminals and built houses for Bosniaks to be able to return 
to their hometown. As a reward, international sanctions were lifted and international aid started 
flowing into the town, increasing its municipal budget and capacity for economic development. 
Recall Initiation  
At the time of the recall, the SNSD leadership was reveling in its electoral success after 
the October 2006 general elections. Following instructions of the party president and prime 
minister of the RS, SNSD counselors forged a local coalition with SDS, the party which held the 
most seats in Foča’s municipal council. No matter that the two parties had been bitter rivals at 
the entity and state levels for ten years, their municipal counselors banded together to initiate a 
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recall against the maverick SP mayor who came from SNSD’s weaker counterpart in 
government.  
Based on the party configurations in the municipal council and the mayor’s 
programmatic-style of governance, it is reasonable to conclude that the source of the conflict was 
the mayor’s high-performance, displayed by his impressive public policy record, which SNSD 
and SDS perceived as a threat to their political power. Although SNSD led the recall initiation, 
the fact that SDS counselors formed a local coalition despite these parties’ intense rivalry at the 
entity-level shows that both parties feared that the new style of governance would hurt them 
politically. Foča’s citizens were adjusting positively to greater local democracy, and left 
unchecked, the demand for greater government responsiveness (rather than patronage benefits or 
intimidation) might spread to other towns as well.  
Failed Recall Referendum and More Punishments 
The recall referendum initially passed with 51% of the vote in favor of the recall. 
However, the results were annulled after the mayor filed a complaint, and the CEC found 
absentee balloting procedures in the referendum to be illegal. Specifically, 1,318 residents with 
refugee status were not allowed to vote, which could have changed the result of the referendum. 
Despite excluding a substantial and vulnerable segment of Foča’s eligible voters, turnout in the 
referendum was higher than in the 2004 local election by nine percentage points. The increase in 
turnout could either be caused by the “dueling machine” phenomenon in which both SNSD and 
SDS mobilized their supporters to vote against the mayor, or it may have been caused by 
passionate residents turning out to support their mayor. Nonetheless, the result horrified SNSD 
and SDS counselors and the SNSD leadership, Milorad Dodik: The mayor stayed in office for 
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the rest of his term and was re-elected in 2008 by 13 percentage points, a higher margin of 
victory than his first term.  
The recall attempt was only the beginning of a slew of punishments that the mayor faced 
by SNSD and his own party, SP. After the recall Milorad Dodik, Prime Minister of the RS and 
party president of SNSD, would personally show up to Foča to debate the mayor in the town hall 
and defame his reputation in front of his constituents. Dodik also tried to intimidate him by 
appearing to arrest him, following him, and once by threatening to hire a hitman to “physically 
liquidate” him. This led the mayor to file a law suit in municipal court against Dodik in 2009, 
accusing him of hate speech and slander. Although impossible to verify directly, the former 
mayor told me that he lost the case because Dodik paid off the judges. The reason given to him, 
which I was able to verify in local media reports, was that Dodik’s remarks did not amount to 
slander because he didn’t mention the mayor’s private life, nor did his statements touch upon the 
mayor’s family. It is also verifiable that the court ordered the ex-mayor to pay procedural 
damages to Dodik. 
In 2010, the mayor was punished by his own party which revoked his party membership 
after he ran for party president. This was probably because they faced pressure from SNSD. The 
mayor then formed his own party, NSP, and lost in 2012 mayoral elections. He formed a multi-
party coalition called NDP which was a collection of weak, progressively-minded opposition 
parties, but unfortunately he lost the mayorship again in 2016.  
Outcome: Mixed Success 
The outcome of this case is mixed. While the strategy of SNSD and SDS to recall the 
mayor did not work, SNSD’s long-term tactics of intimidation and disruption, aided by its 
resource capacities and devious use of partisan accountability was successful in the long-term. 
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By controlling local patronage networks, Dodik sucessfully bribed and intimidated local judges 
to be loyal to SNSD interests, and Dodik certaintly exerted some influence over the mayor’s 
party, SNSD’s weaker coalition partner, to blacklist the mayor. Therefore, success for SNSD 
came in the form of SP revoking the mayor’s party membership and having an SNSD-backed 
candidate beat the former mayor in 2012 and 2016 local elections.  
From the mayor’s perspective, the outcome is also mixed. Although he was removed 
from his own party, the mayor reinvented himself by forming a new party and then joining a 
progressive, left-oriented coalition. Although the mayor lost the past two mayoral elections, he 
also ran for office at the entity-level and is currently an MP in the RS National Assembly, its 
legislative body. 
3.6. Laktaši 
 Laktaši, one of the most economically developed municipalities in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, is the hometown of the president of SNSD and a party stronghold. It was here in 
1996 that the former mayor, a former geography professor, helped to found the party with his 
longtime friend, Milorad Dodik. The mayor was a high-ranking member of the party since its 
establishment. He was immediately selected to be the president of a sub-municipal district and 
then promoted to president of SNSD’s Laktaši branch from 1999 until his resignation in 2014, all 
the while being a member of SNSD’s main board and executive board. Like Banovići, this case 
illustrates how strong parties use partisan accountability to induce loyalty of lower-level 
politicians, and use coercive measures to punish them when they are more responsive to citizens 
than party interests. Rather than developing programmatic linkage with citizens, these parties 
prefer patronage as a means to extend political power over subnational units. However the main 
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difference between the conflicts in Laktaši and Banovići is that the mayor of Laktaši was more 
adept in salvaging his reputation and return to academia. 
Origins of Conflict 
The mayor remains a highly respected public figure in his hometown, known for his 
professionalism and high-performance during his three terms. He was elected to his first term in 
2004 by a margin of 64 percentage points, re-elected in 2008 with a margin of 71 percentage 
points, and won his third term by a margin of 31 points. The drop in his final term likely relates 
to a drop in support for the party,45  as the mayor commanded a higher vote share in all three of 
his races than his co-partisan municipal counselors.46 He also enjoyed a unified municipal 
government in which SNSD controlled the most seats in the council with 76 percent of the seats 
in his first term, 72 in the second, and 48 percent in his final term.  
The mayor’s popularity was rooted in his economic policies and management of the 
municipal government. Laktaši has favorable economic conditions, including fertile, flat land 
that has led to a highly developed agricultural sector, as well as close proximity to Banja Luka 
and to the Croatian border. The mayor’s policies focused on developing the town’s industrial and 
tourism capacity by encouraging the growth of small and medium businesses. For example, he 
hired a young, educated team of advisors and local bureaucrats to craft local development 
strategies and economic policies. Together, they streamlined business registration procedures to 
make to make Laktaši a more attractive location for investors and start-ups, and to encourage 
other industries besides agriculture. As a result, Laktaši has the lowest unemployment rate in the 
                                                 
45SNSD was less successful in the 2012 local elections than it had been in 2008. 
46Municipal counselors are elected by open-list PR in which voters vote for individual candidates or a party. 
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country. This type of programmatic linkage with local residents reinforced the mayor’s image as 
an intelligent and moral person—one of the few politicians in Bosnia who was known to hire 
employees based on merit rather than party loyalty.  
Conflict and Resignation 
The mayor’s conflict was not with municipal counselors nor the municipal 
administration. Instead it was a small clique of unelected, informal party affiliates, who were 
known to be Dodik’s personal friends and business tycoons with criminal ties. Since he did not 
have a favorable opinion towards a particular tycoon that was godfather to Dodik’s children, he 
considered bowing out of the upcoming 2012 mayoral elections. However Dodik insisted that he 
run again because his popularity with the townspeople of Laktaši assured SNSD a comfortable 
win. 
After the mayor’s re-election, the tycoon continued to encroach on the mayor’s decisional 
autonomy. Multiple media sites report that the original conflict was over the tycoon’s local 
soccer club. The tycoon had spent his own personal money on the club and now wanted the 
municipality to repay him for his “loan.” Since this request was illegal, the mayor refused. 
Already dissatisfied with the drop in his vote share in 2012 and under pressure from thuggish 
elements in his party, the mayor participated in several executive board party meetings to 
analyze the drop in party’s vote share in the 2012 elections. Unlike many high-ranking SNSD 
party officials who had been implicated in corruption scandals, the mayor had a pristine public 
reputation. He proposed the party give him greater autonomy and management of the 
municipality, the party would easily gain a majority in the next local elections. Instead, he was 
accused of not being supportive of the party. Sensing intra-party conflict, the mayor wrote an 
open letter in which he criticized the influence of “people from the side” leading internal party 
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politics. The mayor tried to give his resignation, but it was not accepted by SNSD president 
Dodik. An image crisis with a popular mayor leaving the party out of dissatisfaction would not 
do. Instead, Dodik wanted it to look like he fired the mayor. 
Because the mayor’s was more popular with the townspeople than the party was, Dodik 
dared not initiate a recall for fear it would decrease the party’s popularity further. Instead, he 
took smaller steps such as removing him from president of the municipal branch and further 
intimidation. In 2014, two months after the mayor was recognized by a pan-European NGO as 
RS mayor of the decade and the best mayor-manager in the RS, the mayor was finally forced to 
submit his resignation from his position as mayor and ceased all political activities. The mayor’s 
efforts to institutionalize the municipality’s administration, turned out to be in vain. The new 
SNSD mayor too afraid to communicate with him, and the system which the mayor built from 
the ground up went into disarray. The former mayor now works at the Republika Srpska’s 
Institute for Pedagogy, a public educational institution. 
Epilogue 
 The story does not end with this mayor. Three months before the 2016 local elections, 
SNSD president Dodik dissolved the municipal board’s decision to nominate the incumbent 
mayor who had taken over in 2014 when the former mayor resigned. The incumbent also had 
poor relations with the same tycoon as the previous mayor and was refusing the tycoon’s 
demands, so Dodik instructed his close supporters in the municipal board to nominate a different 
candidate for the upcoming mayoral elections. By a vote of 47 to 42, the municipal board 
nominated the incumbent mayor. Livid that so many local board members had gone against his 
wishes, Dodik dismissed the entire board. After a new board was formed, they selected a 
different candidate altogether. 
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3.7. Discussion 
The analysis of the four cases sharpens our understanding of what partisan accountability 
looks like in practice and the conditions under which it is an effective strategy for parties to 
concentrate political power over municipal governments. The cases show that strong parties 
punished disloyal mayors more severely than weaker parties did, and the strong party mayors 
(Banovići and Laktaši) were successfully removed from office. On the other hand, mayors from 
weak parties have survived punishments by switching parties, relying on their popularity with 
citizens, and benefitting from weaker punishments.47 This general finding supports the 
hypothesis linking the treatment variable (strong parties) to the outcome (successfully removing 
mayors) through the mechanism of partisan accountability. 
The source of conflict in all four cases was the mayor’s high performance and 
programmatic linkage with citizens. In all cases except Banovići (whose economy is based 
around its natural resource), mayors established deep connections with international donors to 
fund public projects. It is reasonable to conclude that high-performing, programmatic mayors 
with international connections threaten the interests of strong parties. Responsive governance 
stands in contrast to the mode of governance preferred by the leaders of strong parties, which is 
based on patronage. Party leaders’ control over patronage networks is threatened by politicians 
who earn political support by providing public goods, improving service delivery and spurring 
economic development. Programmatic effort visibly improves the quality of local governance, 
increases the mayor’s popularity with citizens and is a threat to the status quo.  
                                                 
47The mayor from Foča was from a weak party but was severely punished (recall initiated) by a strong party before 
being punished less severely by his own party (removal from party). 
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The analysis also suggests that the punishment strategies of strong parties are more 
severe and center on destroying a mayor’s career. These parties are able to mobilize greater 
organizational and electoral resources to co-opt local party affiliates through partisan 
accountability. Weak parties did not attempt to co-opt municipal counselors and remove mayors 
during their terms, presumably because they did not have enough organizational and electoral 
resources to remove mayors from office. In Foča, the mayor’s party did not revoke membership 
until three years after the recall took place. In Goražde, his weak party did not put pressure on 
the mayor to resign and did not initiate a recall after they revoked his membership. Presumably, 
this is because it would hurt SBB’s public reputation to severely punish one of its most popular 
politicians who was one of only two SBB mayors in the country. 
Table 9: Effect of Punishment on Local Democracy 
Case Mayor’s effort  
(programmatic  
policy output) 
Electoral 
manipulation 
Type of electoral 
manipulation 
Effect on local  
self-governance 
Banovići High-performing Yes Coercion, 
intimidation,  
vote-buying 
negative  
Laktaši High-performing Yes Dissolving local party 
branch, 
Annulling candidate 
nomination 
negative 
Foča High-performing Yes Absentee ballots not 
available 
negative 
Goražde High-performing No  neutral 
 
The analysis also supports the core notion of my theory that partisan accountability is not 
compatible with democratic accountability. Table 9 illustrates the impact of punishments on the 
quality of local democracy according to four different benchmarks. It indicates that all four 
mayors who were punished displayed high-performance in terms of their policy output and 
programmatic effort. There is no question that this was the crucial reason for which each mayor 
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was punished, since putting the interests of their constituents above party elite interests conflicts 
with demands of partisan accountability. The next two columns indicate whether electoral 
manipulation occurred in the recall referendum (or in the next mayoral election in cases where a 
recall was not attempted). We can see that in the cases in which strong parties punished mayors 
(including in Foča where SNSD initiated a recall), irregularities occurred that undermined the 
integrity of elections.  
The final column describes the overall effect that the punishment has had on governance. 
The punishments that were successful impeded the municipal government’s local decision-
making autonomy since party officials and politicians at higher levels influenced the removal of 
mayors (including in Foča where the mayor failed to win re-election), and in the process 
disrupted the municipal administration from doing their regular work and created a hostile 
environment between mayors and initiators. The punishments also enabled parties to install new 
mayors who were more servile to party interests over citizen interests. Since the punishment in 
Goražde was less severe and ultimately unsuccessful, it had a neutral effect: the conflict 
remained at the same level before the punishment occurred and did not impede local governance. 
In sum, the case studies support my theory of partisan accountability, and they show how 
it manifests at the local level by tracing four mayors who were punished by their parties. This 
chapter has illustrated that strong parties punish high-performing, independent-minded mayors in 
order to maintain control over the party’s patronage network and to induce the loyalty of other 
party members. This main finding is supported by the fact that mayors were punished more 
severely by strong parties than by weak parties, and the lengths that the strong parties went to 
mobilize organizational and electoral resources to punish these mayors had negative 
consequences for their political careers. The mayors from weak parties were more successful in 
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salvaging their careers by switching parties or running as independent candidates. Although 
these findings do not give much cause for optimism, they do provide an important lesson. 
Namely, while scholars tend to think of strong parties as an important feature of democracy, the 
evidence from BiH shows that they can also be bastions of authoritarianism that stunt 
subnational democratization. 
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APPENDIX 4: CODING OF ORGANIZATIONAL RESOURCES 
 
1. Finance: Total annual income (averaged for 2012-2015) 
i. Above 1 million KM (500 thousand Euro) (2) 
ii. Between 100 thousand and 1 million KM (1)  
iii. Below 100 thousand KM (0) 
 
2. Number of local branch organizations  
i. Above 50 (2) 
ii. Between 20-50 (1) 
iii. Below 20 (0) 
 
3. Dispersion of local party branches  
i. Branches in both entities (2) 
ii. Dispersed across an entity (1) 
iii. Concentrated in one locality or canton (0) 
  
 
